The Involuntary Civil Commitment Process in Chicago: Practices and Procedures by Duizend, Richard Van & Zimmerman, Joel
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 2 Winter 1984 Article 1 
The Involuntary Civil Commitment Process in Chicago: Practices 
and Procedures 
Richard Van Duizend 
Joel Zimmerman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Richard V. Duizend & Joel Zimmerman, The Involuntary Civil Commitment Process in Chicago: Practices 
and Procedures, 33 DePaul L. Rev. 225 (1984) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol33/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS
IN CHICAGO: PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES*
Richard Van Duizend**
Joel Zimmerman ***
I. INTRODUCTION
In the decades of the sixties and seventies, the fair and humane treatment
of mentally ill persons became a civil rights issue of the first order. The
process for involuntarily confining persons in large public mental health in-
stitutions came under close public scrutiny and legal attack. At the same
time, the development of medications that control many of the symptoms
of mental illness gave greater impetus for community-based care and treat-
ment. Partially in response to these trends, then-Illinois Governor Dan Walker
established a commission in October 1973, to consider and recommend
changes in the state's civil and criminal laws affecting the mentally disabled.
Under the chairpersonship of Judge Joseph Schneider of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, the commission issued a report' three years later that served
as the basis for a major revision of the Illinois Mental Health and Develop-
ment Disabilities Code.2
In 1981, the National Center for State Courts,' through its Institute on
Mental Disabilities and the Law, embarked on a multi-year project examin-
ing involuntary civil commitment processes throughout the country.' The goal
* The opinions and recommendations contained in this article are those of the authors
and are not necessarily those of the National Center for State Courts, its Institute on Mental
Disability and the Law, or the grantor foundations.
The authors wish to acknowledge Deborah Cress and John Wesley for their substantial
assistance in preparing this article, and to thank Ingo Keilitz, Ph.D., Director of the National
Center for State Courts' Institute on Mental Disabilities and the Law, and W. Lawrence Fitch,
Director, Forensic Evaluation, Training and Research Center, Institute of Law, Psychiatry and
Public Policy, University of Virginia, for their comments, suggestions, and criticisms. Recogni-
tion must also be given to the other members of the staff of the Involuntary Civil Commitment
Project without whose time, thoughts, and efforts the research which underlies this article could
not have been accomplished.
** Senior Staff Attorney, National Center for State Courts, A.B., 1968, J.D., 1971, Har-
vard University.
*** Former Associate Director, for Research and Development, National Center for State
Courts. B.A., Psychiatry, Northwestern University; M.S., Industrial Psychiatry, Purdue University;
Ph.D., Experimental Psychiatry, Northwestern University.
1. Governor's Comm'n for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Ill. Report (1976).
[hereinafter cited as Governor's Comm'n Report].
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91V, §§ 1-100 to -903 (1983).
3. The National Center for State Courts (N.C.S.C.) is a private, not-for-profit organiza-
tion headquartered in Williamsburg, Virginia, dedicated to improving justice and modernizing
court operations throughout the country. It functions as an extension of the state court systems,
working on their behalf and in response to their needs.
4. The project was funded by a coalition of private foundations. The major funding base
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of the project was to provide information, based on both theory and prac-
tice, that could be used by the courts, advocates, and mental health, social
service and law enforcement agencies to make the involuntary civil commit-
ment process work as fairly and efficiently as possible. The research involved
a comparative analysis of state statutes and case law, a review of the rele-
vant professional literature, and a detailed study of the civil commitment
practices and procedures in six metropolitan areas, including Chicago.'
Two major products resulted from this work. The first was a series of
reports describing the involuntary civil commitment process, identifying
strengths and weaknesses, and recommending specific changes in procedures
and practices of each site studied.' The second was a set of guidelines to
facilitate the development and use of fair, realistic procedures for involun-
tary civil commitment. These guidelines attempt to strike a difficult but im-
portant balance between society's interest in the treatment of and protection
from mentally ill persons, and the individual's interest in liberty and privacy.7
This article is based on the site report, Involuntary Civil Commitment
in Chicago. It is not intended as either a definitive legal analysis of the Il-
linois Mental Health Code or a scholarly analysis of the issues. To reference
the enormous professional literature on civil commitment as it relates to the
manifold issues addressed in this article would have been an enormous task,
was a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of Chicago. Funding
for local site work in Chicago was a grant from the Chicago Community Trust. Funding to
support dissemination of the results and recommendations of the prospect was provided by
the Aetna Life and Casualty Foundation.
5. The other areas studied were Columbus, Ohio; Milwaukee, Wisc.; Los Angeles County,
Cal.; New York, N.Y.; and Winston-Salem, N.C.
Site work included review of the pertinent statutes and case law, interviews with system
participants and observation of hearings. Four members of the project staff spent one week
in Chicago in September 1981. All court hearings conducted during this period at the Chicago-
Read Mental Health Center and the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute were observed by project
staff. Notes taken at the hearings followed a detailed observation guide prepared in advance
of the site visit. Interviews were conducted with over 30 individuals who were involved on
a daily basis in the civil commitment process. They included judges, assistant State's Attorneys,
assistant Public Defenders, representatives from private and public patient advocate agencies
and organizations, including the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, psychiatrists,
mental health system personnel, police officials and members of the academic community. In-
terview guides were mailed to prospective interviewees so that they could review the areas of
concern in advance and prepare for the interviews if they wished to. Most participants were
interviewed individually, although some were interviewed in groups. With very few exceptions,
all interviews were conducted by two or three staff members.
6. The site reports include: INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPART-
MENT, NEW YORK CITY; INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN Los ANGELES COUNTY; INVOLUN-
TARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLUMBUS, OHIO; INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN CHICAGO;
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA; and AN EVALUATION
OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN. Copies of these reports may
be obtained from the Publications Department of the National Center for State Courts, 300
Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185.
7. The general procedural guide, PROVISIONAL SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES
FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT, is also available from the Publications Department at
the National Center for State Courts.
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increased the bulk of this already long article, and added little to the base
of knowledge. 8 Rather, this article presents an accurate and representative
report of the practices and opinions of the judges, attorneys, physicians,
mental health professionals, and administrators who are daily participants
in the civil commitment process in Chicago. 9
After defining some of the terms employed and providing a brief over-
view of the applicable civil commitment procedures, the findings are presented
in roughly chronological order, proceeding from prehearing events to
posthearing review. Our conclusions and recommendations follow. It should
be understood that this article applies only to the process of civil commit-
ment in the city of Chicago. It is not meant to apply to any other parts
of the state of Illinois, or even to Chicago's nearby suburbs. It also relates
only to the mentally ill adults of Chicago who are within the civil system
of law, and not to prisoners, minors, or persons who are developmentally
disabled. The data for this article was gathered during September 1981. The
final report was released in review draft at the end of 1981, and is accurate
as of that time.
8. See, e.g., A.D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1974);
B.D. SALES, D.M. POWELL, R. VAN DUIZEND AND Assocs., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW:
STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES (1982); A.A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRAN-
SITION (1976); D.B. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES (1981); Chambers, Alter-
natives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives,
70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972); Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Men-
tally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 499 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of
Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Ennis and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presump-
tion of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Gaskins
and Wasow, Vicious Circles in Civil Commitment, 24 SOCIAL WORK 127 (1979); Mental Health
Law Project, Proposal for Change-Civil Commitment, 2 MEN. DIS. L. RPTR. 78 (1977); Nedelsley
and Schotten, Civil Commitment and the Value of Liberty, 46 SOCIAL RESEARCH 374 (1979);
Preparation and Trial of a Civil Commitment Case, 5 MEN. DIS. L. RPTR. 201, 281, 358 (1981);
Szasz, The Danger of Coercive Psychiatry, 61 A.B.A. J. 1246 (1975); Whitmer, From Hospitals
to Jails: The Fate of California's Deinstitutionalized Mentally Ill, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
65 (1980); Zimmerman, Fitch and Barnett, Involuntary Commitment: the Discerning Eye of
the Law, 5:4 ST. CT. J. 5 (1981).
9. When it is reported that certain events occur in Chicago, it should be understood that
this means we were told that those events occur, or that we observed them occurring. If specific
sources of information are not cited, it can be assumed that this information was reported
by virtually all those who were interviewed and observed. If information came only from cer-
tain sources, or if it differed from information from other sources, then the specific source
of the information is reported. All sources are reported as generic categories of people, such
as judges, attorneys, doctors, mental health professionals, and so on. Specific names are not
used because we have attempted to maintain the confidentiality of the information that was
provided to us.
In order to achieve greater accuracy, the individuals who served this project in the capacity
of advisors and data sources were given the opportunity to review the report before its final
release, to detect and correct errors, and to suggest revisions in the report's recommendations.
No topic of this complexity can generate a perfect unanimity of opinion, however. Differences
in perceptions are acknowledged as much as possible. When conclusions or recommendations
had to be fixed in one direction or another, though, the final decisions were made by the
project staff and it is they who must be accountable for whatever degree of wisdom or folly
was thereby created.
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II. TERMINOLOGY
Some terms used throughout this article deserve special comment. The most
important is the word "commitment" and its various forms and derivatives.
The current vogue is to use the word "hospitalization" because of the strong
negative connotations of "commitment." However, we have chosen to use
"commitment" for two reasons. First, it is a term that is commonly used
and well understood. Second, in Illinois and several other states, commit-
ment and hospitalization are not synonymous. Hospitalization is merely one
form that an order of commitment may take.' Thus, the choice was made
to use the word "commitment" despite the stigma that has been associated
with it.
Two other words used frequently in this article are "respondent" and "pa-
tient." These words are essentially synonymous for purposes of this report.
Technically, a patient is a person who has been admitted for mental health
treatment, with or without a court commitment, either as an inpatient or
outpatient." A respondent is a person who is the subject of an involuntary
commitment proceeding. Generally, the article refers to the person as "respon-
dent" with regard to that person's involvement in legal proceedings before
a commitment has been ordered. The person is referred to as a "patient"
with regard to treatment.
Finally, there is the term "treatment." Treatment is defined as it is in
the Illinois statute: "an effort to accomplish an improvement in the mental
condition or a related behavior of a patient. Treatment includes, but is not
limited to, hospitalization, partial hospitalization, outpatient services, examina-
tion, diagnoses, evaluation, care, training, psychotherapy, pharmaceuticals,
and other services provided for patients by mental health facilities."' 2
II1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS IN CHICAGO
This overview is a blend of both what is required by statute and what
actually happens in practice. The implementation of the civil commitment
law in Illinois, as in all other states, is not always what would be expected
from a literal reading of the commitment statute. While most statutory pro-
visions are adhered to strictly, some are not. More importantly, the system
has evolved procedures for working through problems and making decisions
in situations that are not addressed specifically by statute.
Overview of the System
The Chicago system for providing treatment to persons who are mentally
ill is shown schematically in the figure as follows:
10. Commitment is more nearly synonymous with "court-ordered treatment," but this is
not exactly accurate either in a system such as Illinois' in which a patient, though committed,
still retains the right to refuse treatment.
11. Outpatients are more frequently referred to as "clients" by mental health professionals,
but they will be called "patients" in this article.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-128 (1983).
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STAGE 1. PERSON HAS A MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEM
A. Person pursues community outpatient treatment (Go to 2.1)
B. Person requests hospital treatment (Go to 2.2)
C. Others initiate action for involuntary treatment (Go to 2.3)
D. No treatment sought; everybody copes (END)
STAGE 2. EFFORTS ARE MADE TO INITIATE (OR CONTINUE)
TREATMENT AS . . .
2.1 COMMUNITY OUTPATIENT TREATMENT
A. Person receives treatment (Go to 7)
B. Person referred to hospital as voluntary patient (Go to 2.2)
C. Person referred to hospital involuntarily (Go to 2.3)
2.2 VOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION
A. Hospital admits and treats as "informal" (Go to 6)
B. Hospital admits and treats as involuntary (Go to 6)
C. Hospital refuses to admit; patient may appeal (Go to 1)
2.3 INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
A. Police or State's Attorney divert case (Go to 1)
B. Person decides to seek voluntary treatment; case dismissed (Go
to 2.1 or 2.2)
C. Person remains at home; CMHC examines and does not certify;
case dismissed (END)
D. Persons remains at home; CMHC examines and certifies for hear-
ing (Go to 3)
E. Hospital examines and releases (END)
F. Hospital examines and certifies for hearing (Go to 3)
STAGE 3. A COURT HEARING IS SCHEDULED
A. Symptoms remit, person discharged, case dismissed (END)
B. "Technicalities" arise; case is continued (Stay at 3) or dismissed
(END)
C. Hearing takes place (Go to 4)
STAGE 4. A COURT HEARING IS HELD
A. Judge dismisses case; person discharged (END)
B. Judge commits to hospital for treatment (Go to 5.1)
C. Judge commits to alternative treatment (Go to 5.2)
STAGE 5. PERSON IS UNDER LEGAL ORDER TO RECEIVE
TREATMENT . . .
5.1 IN A HOSPITAL
A. Treatment status continues for statutory interval; symptoms remit
(Go to 7) or continue (Go to 2.3)
B. Treatment until hospital wishes to discharge patient (Go to 6.1)
C. Treatment until patient wants to be discharged (Go to 6.2 or 6.3)
19841
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5.2 IN A LESS RESTRICTIVE MANNER
A. Treatment status continues for statutory period; symptoms remit
(Go to 7) or continue (Go to 2.3)
B. Treatment director or court decides hospitalization is required (Go
to 3)
STAGE 6. TERMINATION OF TREATMENT IS SOUGHT
6.1 BY THE HOSPITAL
A. Patient is discharged (Go to 7)
B. Patient resists discharge by successful appeal to Utilization Review
Committee or court (Go to 5.1)
6.2 BY A VOLUNTARY PATIENT
A. Hospital discharges patient (Go to 7)
B. Hospital initiates petition for involuntary treatment (Go to 3)
C. Patient escapes (Go to 7)
6.3 BY AN INVOLUNTARY PATIENT
A. Treating facility discharges (Go to 7)
B. Patient appeals commitment decision (Go to 3)
C. Patient brings habeas writ (Go to 3)
D. Patient files petition for discharge (Go to 3)
E. Patient escapes (Go to 5.1 A. or 5.2 A. or 7)
STAGE 7. PATIENT IS DISCHARGED FROM TREATMENT
A. No further problems (END)
B. Person recidivates (Go to 1)
The process begins when a person exhibits what appears to be a mental
health problem (Stage 1).'" Many people receive treatment for mental health
problems through Chicago's excellent system of community mental health
centers (CMHCs) (Stage 2.1). The CMHC operates within a community to
provide outpatient treatment services. If the person's condition is such that
the CMHC cannot provide effective treatment or if outpatient services are
not sought, the person may then be brought to a hospital (Stage 2).
Persons desiring admission to a mental health facility for treatment of
mental illness may be admitted upon their request, without making formal
application, just as they would enter a hospital for the treatment of any
physical ailment (Stage 2.2). Upon admission, these patients are examined
and classified as either "informal" or "voluntary," depending upon their
condition. If the facility director considers that the individual is clinically
13. Of course, many people have mental health problems to greater or lesser degrees and
never seek any type of formal treatment. They, and others who come into contact with them,
simply cope with whatever difficulties this may create.
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suitable for admission as an "informal" patient, the individual is so
admitted" and is informed that he or she may leave at any time. 5
If, instead, the facility director decides to admit the individual as a "volun-
tary" patient, that individual may be discharged "at the earliest appropriate
time, not to exceed five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays,"
after giving a written notice of the desire to be discharged, unless within
that time, an involuntary civil commitment petition and two certificates are
filed, stating that the patient requires hospitalization.' 6 Hospitals are not
obligated to accept patients who wish to be admitted for the treatment of
mental problems, but patients who are refused admission have a right to
appeal this decision to a hospital administrative committee.' 7 In practice,
most people who receive hospital care for mental health problems do so
as "voluntary" or "informal" patients.' 8
The focus of this article, however, is on those patients who enter the mental
health system involuntarily (Stage 2.3). A person is subject to involuntary
admission if the individual is "mentally ill and . . . because of his illness
is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another
in the near future or . . . who is mentally ill and . . . because of his illness
is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from
serious harm." 9
Commitment proceedings may be initiated in several different ways. Friends
or relatives of the individual may begin commitment proceedings by prepar-
ing a petition2" stating that the individual is in need of commitment. The
petition must be accompanied by a "certificate executed by a physician,
qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist which states that the respondent
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91V2, § 3-300(a) (1983). The statute does not define "informal,"
nor does it provide any criteria to be used by the facility director in making a determination
on "informal" status. Consequently, it is possible that facility directors at different institutions
may vary as to the factors utilized to determine whether a patient may be informally admitted.
15. Id. § 3-300(b).
16. Id. § 3-403. The certificates must be executed by a physician, qualified examiner or
clinical psychologist who has examined the patient not more than 72 hours prior to admission.
Id. § 3-602.
17. Id. § 3-405(a). A patient denied admission to a mental health facility must be immediately
provided with written notice of their right to request review of the denial. The patient then
has 14 days to submit a written request for review of the denial. The director of the mental
health facility then has seven days from the receipt of this written request to hold a hearing
on the denial of admission. Id.
18. Private hospitals, in particular, admit individuals as "informal" patients. Most patients
admitted to state institutions on their own initiative are classified as "voluntary." N.C.S.C.,
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN CHICAGO 31 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO SITE
REPORT].
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (1983).
20. Id. § 3-601(a). Any person 18 years or older may prepare a petition for involuntory
commitment. Id. §§ 3-601(a), 3-701(a). If a certificate does not accompany the petition, the
petition must include the information required in §§ 3-601(b) and 3-603(b). Id. § 3-603(b).
If a certificate accompanies the petition, only the information required by § 3-601(b) must
be provided. Id. § 3-601(b).
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is subject to involuntary admission and requires immediate hospitalization.""
Upon receipt of the petition and certificate, the sheriff of the county in which
the patient may be found (or the sheriff's designee) transports the patient
to the appropriate facility.22 If a certificate has not been acquired, the pa-
tient may be held for no more than twenty-four hours.2" Even when the
petition is accompanied by an examiner's certificate, a second certificate must
be completed by a psychiatrist after an examination of the patient, if the
person is to be held for treatment for more than twenty-four hours.2"
Public officials can also begin involuntary commitment proceedings on
the basis of their own observations. If there are reasonable grounds to believe
a person is subject to involuntary commitment and hospitalization is needed,
peace officers" may initiate involuntary admission by completing and filing
the required petition.26 However, the certificates still must be obtained to
hold a patient for more than twenty-four hours." In practice, police of-
ficials or an Assistant State's Attorney, acting on a citizen's complaint, in-
formally evaluate the circumstances surrounding the complaint. The official
may divert the case from any further formal involvement by sending all con-
cerned individuals home or referring them to a CMHC. They also may en-
courage the individual to voluntarily commit him or herself, a step that may
be taken even after involuntary commitment proceedings have begun. A court
also can initiate involuntary admission proceedings, but again, only for
twenty-four hours without petition and certifications.28
Finally, involuntary commitment proceedings may be initiated by hospital
staff. As is noted above, this ordinarily occurs after a voluntarily admitted
patient gives notice of intent to leave the facility.
There are many procedural safeguards built into the system to protect the
rights of patients and prospective patients. For example, within twelve hours
after the admission of a person to a mental health facility, either by emer-
gency certification or by court order, the facility director must give the per-
son a copy of the petition and a clear and concise written statement explain-
ing the person's legal status, right to counsel, and right to a court hearing. 9
Following admission, any changes in legal status must be fully explained
21. Id. § 3-602. The patient must have been examined by the person executing the cer-
tificate less than 72 hours prior to admission. Id. In some circumstances the patient may be
allowed to remain at home until the commitment examination. Id. § 3-704(a).
22. Id. § 3-605.
23. Id. §§ 3-604, 3-607, 3-704(a).
24. Id. § 3-610.
25. Peace officers are defined as "any sheriff, police officer, or other person deputized
by proper authority to serve as a peace office." Id. § 1-118.
26. Id. § 3-606.
27. Id. § 3-604.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 3-205. If the patient does not read or understand English, then some method
of communication which the patient comprehends must be employed prior to any hearing so
that the patient will be informed of these rights. Id.
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to the person.3" Furthermore, anyone twelve years old or over is provided
with the address and phone number of the Illinois Guardianship and Ad-
vocacy Commission and is assisted in contacting the Commission upon
request. 3
After commitment proceedings are initiated, the next step is a comprehen-
sive physical and mental examination. The examination must occur within
twenty-four hours of admission.2 Persons twelve years old or over, prior
to the examination, must be informed "in a simple comprehensible manner
of the purpose of the examination; that . . . [they do] not have to talk
to the examiner; and that any statements [made] may be disclosed at a court
hearing on the issue" of eligibility for involuntary admission.33 The results
of this examination will determine whether the person is immediately released
and the case dismissed, or whether a judicial hearing will be scheduled to
determine whether the person should be ordered into treatment. At any time
prior to the hearing, a respondent may request admission as an informal
or a voluntary patient. "If the facility director approves such a request, the
court may dismiss the pending proceedings but may require proof that such
dismissal is in the best interests of the [patient] and of the public." 3 4
If a hearing is necessary (Stage 4), it must be held within five days of
admission, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays." If within that time
period, the symptoms of the mental health problem remit, the person may
be discharged, and the case may be dismissed. To the extent practicable,
hearings are held in the mental health facility where the patient is
hospitalized.36
Respondents have the right to be represented by the counsel of their choice,
an attorney from the Guardianship and Mental Health Advocacy Commis-
sion, a Public Defender, or other court-appointed attorney.37 In Chicago,
most respondents are represented by an Assistant Public Defender. An Assis-
tant State's Attorney presents the case for the state.3" Within twenty-four
hours of admission, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, the admis-
sion papers are made available to the attorneys involved so that they may
begin work on the case.39
The respondent is usually present at the hearing, "unless his attorney waives
his right to be present and the court is satisfied by a clear showing that
30. Id. § 3-206.
31. Id.
32. Id. §§ 3-604, 3-607, 3-704.
33. Id. § 3-208. The explanation must be given by the examiner. Failure of the examiner
to provide this information will prevent the examiner from testifying at the court hearing regarding
the respondent's admission. Id.
34. Id. § 3-801.
35. Id. § 3-706.
36. Id. § 3-800.
37. Id. § 3-805.
38. Id. § 3-101.
39. Id. § 3-609.
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the respondent's attendance would subject him to substantial risk of serious
physical or emotional harm." ' In practice, this exception is rarely used.
Additionally, the respondent has a right to have the determination of his
or her eligibility for commitment made by a jury."' Whether the hearing
is before a judge or a jury, a respondent cannot be involuntarily committed
unless it has been found by clear and convincing evidence that the respon-
dent is:
Mentally ill and because of his illness [there is] . . . a reasonable expecta-
tion that he will inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another
in the near future; or . . . because of his illness is unable to provide for
his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm. ,2
If a person is found eligible for commitment, the appropriate disposition
must be determined. The director of the facility in which the respondent
is hospitalized, or such other person as the court may direct, must prepare
a report including information about the appropriateness and availability of
less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization, and describing respondent's
needs, treatment, and an appropriate timetable for treatment."3 The judge
must then order treatment within either a hospital or an alternative setting
(Stage 5)."
For people who are seriously mentally ill, few alternatives to hospitaliza-
tion are available. One option is for the judge to order a patient into the
care and custody of a family member, if the family member is willing and
able to provide for the patient's treatment needs. 5 Treatment in a less restric-
tive mode, such as care and custody through an outpatient clinic, as well
as treatment in a hospital, will continue as ordered by the judge until either
the sixty-day statutorily prescribed commitment period ends, the symptoms
remit, or an attempt is made to change the patient's status (Stage 5.2)."
If during the course of outpatient treatment, it is decided that the patient
requires hospitalization after all, a court hearing must be held to determine
whether or not hospitalization should be ordered."'
When involuntary admission is necessary, a person is usually admitted to
a public hospital (usually Chicago-Read or Manteno), although a patient can
be ordered to a private hospital, if the hospital is willing to accept the
patient.' Treatment is made available to the patient for up to sixty days,
at the end of which the patient is either discharged or changed to a volun-
40. Id. § 3-806. In practice, this exception is rarely employed.
41. Id. § 3-802. The jury consists of six people chosen in the same manner as other civil jurors.
42. Id. § 1-119. The standard of proof in involuntary civil commitment cases is clear and
convincing evidence. Id. § 3-308.
43. Id. § 3-810. This treatment plan must be updated during the course of treatment as
the patient's condition warrants, but in any event not less than every 30 days. Id. § 3-814.
44. Id. § 3-811.
45. Id.
46. Id. §§ 3-812, 3-813, 3-815.
47. Id. §§ 3-815(b).
48. Id. § 3-811, CHICAGO SITE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32.
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tary status, or the hospital initiates the process leading to a hearing on the
question of retaining the patierit.' 9 If the patient's symptoms remit, the pa-
tient may be discharged prior to the end of the commitment period (Stage
6.1), although the patient may appeal a discharge to the hospital's ad-
ministrative committee."
Patients whom hospitals continue to treat on an involuntary basis may
seek their release in several ways. Patients have the right to appeal the original
commitment decision, although this is an infrequent event." A patient may
file a petition for discharge, which will guarantee that within five working
days, a judicial hearing must be held on the question of whether the patient
still meets the criteria of being subject to involuntary admission.2 Patients
also may file a writ of habeas corpus, which may also result in a judicial
hearing." Not infrequently, involuntary patients terminate their relationships
with the hospital through escape. Such patients are retained "on the books"
in the status of absentees until the completion of the commitment period.5 '
The initial extension of a commitment order may be for another sixty
days; all subsequent extensions may be for up to 180 days." Patients who
are discharged from hospitals are given a small supply of medication and
information on how to contact community mental health agencies. If men-
tal health problems arise again, which unfortunately is the case for many
former patients, the entire process is begun anew. 6
IV. FINDINGS
It is impossible to present findings regarding the system for the involun-
tary treatment of the mentally ill without getting caught up in differences
of opinion and conflicting attitudes about mental illness and society's pro-
per response and responsibility. Some people value a system that can pro-
vide easily for the treatment of mentally ill individuals because of the ob-
vious need and society's responsibility to respond to the need, even if treat-
ment must be coerced. Other people value a mental health system to the
extent that it can protect individuals from hospitalization or from having
treatment being thrust upon them involuntarily. For ease of future reference,
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 3-813(a) (1983).
50. Id. § 3-903(b).
51. Id. § 3-816(b). At best, appeals take from three to four weeks to be heard. By this
time, many respondents already have been released from the hospital and have no further in-
terest in pursuing the legal issues on appeal even if release did not render those issues moot.
Most respondents are concerned primarily with getting out of the hospital rather than with
establishing a point of law. Hence, for the purpose of seeking release from an institution,
other legal actions are much more expedient, and few appeals are filed.
52. Id. § 3-900. If a patient is not released as a result of this hearing, he or she may re-
quest other discharge hearings during the remainder of the commitment period, although the
court need not grant hearings on these requests. Id. § 3-901(c).
53. Id. § 3-905.
54. CHICAGO SITE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 3-813, 3-815 (1983).
56. CHICAGO SITE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33.
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the first of these perspectives will be referred to as the "helping attitude"
and the second of these as the "liberty attitude."
Some people hold these attitudes in the extreme. Those who are strongly
biased toward the helping attitude may contend that mental illness is, per
se, sufficient reason to treat an individual against his or her will because
that person's capacity for voluntary and intelligent decisionmaking is
necessarily impaired. This is not to say that people who subscribe firmly
to the helping attitude propound the abolition of all rights, however. They
may maintain a strong orientation toward respecting patients, minimizing
unnecessary restrictions, and providing humane and adequate care. On the
other extreme, those who hold the liberty attitude may contend that mental
illness really does not exist. They view people as having wide ranges of
behavior to which society must accomodate without interference. Such people,
however, agree that behavior harmful to others is cause for concern, but
they argue it should be handled through the criminal, rather than the civil,
justice system.
Try as one may to balance the helping attitude and the liberty attitude,
many situations arise in civil commitment procedures that bring these two
attitudes into sharp conflict. Differences in opinion about what decisions
may be right or wrong, stem from a fundamental disagreement about the
system's objectives as seen in the context of these two contrasting points
of view. 7 Thus, disagreements about the value of a civil commitment system
frequently can be understood by merely noting these differing attitudinal
perspectives. The best system will find ways to accommodate both interests;
but conflicts between them are admittedly impossible to avoid and occa-
sionally will force a choice between one or the other. In this article we have
attempted to represent the helping attitude and the liberty attitude in equal
strength.
A. Prehearing
By far, the major strength of the Chicago system is its network of
CHMCs. The community centers offer a wide array of services to all Chicago
residents, regardless of financial means. The large number of centers, along
with their community orientation, makes it easy for people to receive help
and probably lowers the demand for extensive inpatient care. The mental
health centers also provide an effective network of aftercare services for pa-
tients who are released from hospitals. Patients who can receive effective
57. As an example, suppose that a medical certificate supporting the commitment of a respon-
dent is filed with the court 12 hours later than required by the statute. What should the judge
do? A judge may dismiss the case because the hospital did not follow the letter of the law.
Or, the judge may order the patient's continued retention in a hospital, despite the "legal
technicalities," in order that the patient can continue to be considered for treatment. The ac-
tion that is considered "right" for the judge depends upon whether one has a stronger attitude
toward helping a person or protecting a person's liberty interests.
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treatment through outpatient clinics may be less likely to reenter the judicial
system for involuntary commitment.
As a result of these extensive community services, and a commitment statute
that sets a rigid criterion for involuntary treatment, a majority of those enter-
ing the Chicago mental health system are either not admitted by the hospital,
enter on a voluntary basis, or are admitted and subsequently discharged
before a hearing is held. The preheating is the total extent of their involve-
ment in the involuntary civil commitment process. Consequently, those per-
sons who reach the judicial hearing stage are usually seriously mentally ill.58
This is a major reason for the high percentage of hearings that result in
commitments to hospital inpatient facilities.
1. Initiating Mental Health Treatment
Most involuntary commitments begin outside a hospital setting. In these
instances, Chicago police officers are called upon to provide transportation
to a public hospital and, in some cases, to serve a screening function as
well. The latter role occurs most frequently in response to a call for assistance
from a family member or concerned citizen. When the situation does not
appear to be an emergency, police officers or police dispatchers frequently
direct the caller to contact the office of the State's Attorney to obtain a
court writ authorizing the respondent's detention. 9 In those cases in which
the police respond to the call, they decide on the basis of their own obser-
vations, whether the respondent's behavior warrants formal treatment through
the mental health system, the criminal justice system, or diversion to an in-
formal means of treatment. If the police decide that the person should be
examined at a hospital, they attempt to have the person who made the in-
itial call act as petitioner rather than assume that responsibility themselves.
In addition, police on the beat may witness behaviors that they think in-
dicate a mental health problem. In these cases, the police are authorized
to take respondents into custody and bring them directly to mental health
facilities (usually an inpatient facility.)6"
58. Of course, this characteristic of the Chicago system has potential drawbacks as well.
Assuming that any person who enters the system is seriously ill may be a grave error. Simply
because respondents are scheduled for a hearing does not mean that they are in need of mental
health treatment. Even though the CMHCs effectively screen out most of the less serious cases,
the challenge to the judicial system is to evaluate cases carefully, free of any unwarranted
predisposition toward commitment.
59. The Assistant State's Attorney reviews the case with the complainant and decides whether
or not it is appropriate for the mental health system. If the Assistant State's Attorney does
not divert the case at this point, he or she has the complainant initiate a petition and thereupon
takes the case before a judge. If the judge issues a writ authorizing the respondent's detention,
the police are notified to take respondent into custody and transport him or her to a hospital
for examination.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 /, § 3-606 (1983). The statute permits the police to take a per-
son to a mental health facility when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person
needs to be hospitalized immediately to protect the person or others from physical harm. Id.
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In performing these transportation and screening functions, Chicago police
officers provide a valuable and difficult service, and many of our interviewees
commended individual officers for their assistance and understanding. In
recognition of the significance of these roles to the community, training
should be made available to police officers concerning the nature of mental
health disorders, techniques for communicating and handling mentally
disordered persons, and the community resources that are available.6'
When respondents are transported by the police to a hospital for a men-
tal health examination, they are considered to be in "protective custody."
The police have negotiated a "no decline agreement" with several hospitals
in the Chicago area, meaning that the hospitals have agreed not to refuse
summarily to examine patients brought to them in this manner. If the respon-
dent has engaged in a criminal misdemeanor, an officer may take respon-
dent for a mental health evaluation and await the hospital's decision of
whether or not to admit. If the hospital decides to admit, the police or-
dinarily do not pursue the misdemeanor charges. If criminal behavior of
a felony nature is involved, the respondent always is taken directly for an
appearance before a judge. Mental health treatment, if indicated, then oc-
curs by means of the criminal justice system-most frequently at the Cook
County Jail.
A small proportion of the involuntary commitments begin when
respondents arrive at a hospital or mental health center accompanied by
family members or other concerned people. After going through a psychiatric
examination, the respondent may prefer to go home, but the psychiatrist
may decide the person is in need of hospitalization. The psychiatrist, or more
frequently one of the people who accompanied the respondent to the mental
health facility, then initiates a petition and medical certificate and the pa-
tient is admitted to the hospital.
Mental health treatment also may be initiated by a judge based upon obser-
vation of an individual in court.62 According to the report of the Gover-
nor's Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois, the
intent of this statutory provision is to enable a judge to initiate mental treat-
ment for a person who might require immediate admission during the judicial
process, and to allow a person accused of a crime to be treated in a mental
health facility as an alternative to incarceration.6 3 It has been alleged by
61. An inexpensive and minimal way in which to do this would be to arrange informal
briefings for the beat officers, given by professional staff of the community mental health centers.
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 3-607 (1983). The court must have "reasonable grounds
to believe that a person appearing before it is . . . in need of immediate hospitalization to
protect such person or others from physical harm .. " Additionally, the court must include
in its order for detention the facts "in detail" upon which the decision to detain is based. Id.
63. Governor's Comm'n Report, supra note 1, at 53-4. For the sake of completeness, it
should be noted that a small number of civil commitment patients have been transferred through
other procedures from the criminal justice system. These are special cases to which no further
attention will be given in this article.
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some attorneys, however, that this provision in the statute is used in civil
commitment cases that fail to meet all statutory requirements, such as those
in which information is incomplete in a petition or certificate. Rather than
dismiss a case, the judge can use this provision of the law immediately to
initiate a new commitment proceeding, thereby retaining custody of the
respondent. 64
2. Petitions and Certificates
The petition serves as an allegation by the petitioner that the respondent
is in need of treatment. 65 Certificates are statements filed by experts (who
may be certified social workers and registered nurses, physicians, psychiatrists,
or psychologists) in support of the petitioner's contention." To detain an
involuntary respondent more than twenty-four hours, in either an emergency
or nonemergency situation, two certificates must be filed, one of which must
be signed by a psychiatrist.
67
The comments regarding petitions and certificates in Chicago strongly
reflect the divergence between the "liberty" and the "helping" attitudes
discussed earlier. For example, there is strong disagreement about the quality
of the information contained in these documents and the consequences of
having deficiencies 68 in them. Hospital staff tend to report that when the peti-
tions and certificates are deficient in some way, judges tend to dismiss the
cases, thereby frustrating attempts to give treatment for people who 'need
it. The Assistant Public Defenders and other attorneys, on the other hand,
agree that these documents occasionally have legal deficiencies. But they
report that judges usually overlook such deficiencies, continue to hold the
respondent in custody, and hear the case on its merits. In their opinion,
this deprives the respondents of their statutory legal protections. 69 Both are
64. All of the involuntary admissions referred to above are authorized by the Illinois statute
as "emergency" admissions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , Art. VI (1983). In all of these, it is
alleged not only that the person is subject to involuntary admission but also that he or she
is in need of immediate hospitalization. The Mental Health and Development Disabilities Code
also provides for admission to a hospital in a nonemergency situation subsequent to a petition
by another person which describes the reasons for court ordered admission. Id. §§ 3-700 to
-706. The nonemergency procedures are seldom used, however, in large part because persons
not requiring immediate hospitalization can obtain mental health care from the CHMCs.
65. Id. §§ 3-601, 3-603, 3-701. The basic petition must include at a minimum a detailed
statement of the reasons why the person should be involuntarily admitted; the names and ad-
dresses of close relatives, or if none are identified, the friends of the person; the relationship
of the petitioner to the person and whether the petitioner has a legal or financial interest in
the matter; and the names, addresses, and phone numbers of witnesses who could prove the
assertions made in the petition. Id. § 3-601(b).
66. Id. §§ 3-602, 3-702, 3-703.
67. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 3-610 (1983).
69. Id. §§ 3-601, 3-602, 3-604, 3-608, 3-610, 3-702, 3-703, 3-704.
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probably correct in their perception, in that judges who tend to adhere to
the "helping" attitude generally consider the substance of the petition as
more important than its form and would frequently detain a respondent where
the deficiencies are only formal; whereas judges who adhere to the "liberty"
attitude, give greater emphasis to the protection of the respondent's legal
rights.
Additionally, there was agreement among a number of interviewees that
information provided in the petitions is sometimes general and overly reliant
upon unsubstantiated opinion, particularly with regard to whether the respon-
dent is dangerous or is substantially unable to care for his or her basic
physical needs. Most professionals agree that although psychiatrists are cer-
tainly more accurate in detecting mental illness, their conclusions about the
dangerousness or the ability of a person to care for himself are often no
more reliable than those of lay individuals.70 In many instances, dangerousness
can be more accurately assessed on the basis of reports about the respon-
dent's behavior "on the streets" rather than from results of an examination
in a doctor's office. This was recognized in the Governor's Commission
Report, which commented "that it would be difficult to consistently and
accurately apply the subjective evaluation of dangerousness or helplessness
. . . without the support of an overt act or threat."" Despite this conclu-
sion, the current statute does not require that the petitioner report an overt
act or threat." A commitment can proceed on the basis of lay opinion, ex-
pressed in a petition, without citation to overt behavior to support these
conclusions.
Although attorneys have argued for requiring a report of an overt act,
doctors are pleased that this is not a statutory requirement. Doctors observe
that people may behave in ways that strongly suggest violence to themselves
or others but that are not explicitly violent or threatening. They cite ex-
amples of people who speak about going to join their dead parents, or of
a man whose wife is deceased and who talks cheerfully about re-uniting his
children with their mother. While statements such as these are neither violent
acts nor explicit threats, they can precede tragic acts of violence by people
who are in a psychotic state. Empirical research, however, suggests that the
incidence of actual violent acts following such statements is small. Therefore,
attorneys prefer the overt act requirement. Doctors, on the other hand, feel
70. See, e.g., Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
439 (1974); Ennis and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 692, 711-17 (1974); Middleton, Predicting Violence: Law
Psychiatrists be Seers?, 66 A.B.A. J. 829 (1980); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence be
Predicted, 18 CRIME & DELIN. 393 (1972); see also A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A
SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 27-33 (1975).
71. Governor's Comm'n Report, supra note 1, at 16.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91./, § 3-601(b)(1) (1983). Cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (1)(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1980-1981) (evidence of overt act required to be alleged in a petition).
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that the risk indicated by such statements is sufficiently great to justify in-
itiating a commitment, and they prefer that overt acts and threats not be
required on petitions. Thus, depending on one's perspective, the absence of
a requirement that overtly dangerous behavior or threats be proven can be
seen as a strength or as a weakness of the Chicago civil commitment process.
A middleground, recommended by the report on which this article is based,
may be for courts to encourage that specific overt acts or threats be record-
ed on mental health petitions whenever possible. This would limit the risk
that a person may be taken into custody on the basis of the conclusory
statements and unsubstantiated opinions of a petitioner, without curtailing
the court's authority to respond in an exceptional case.73
The problems that occur in petitions are magnified by the common prac-
tice of repeating, without elaboration, the allegations set forth in the peti-
tion and the first medical certificates. The examiner's certificates ideally
should present independently both facts and statements of opinion. Attorneys
in Chicago, however, report that certificates more commonly contain only
statements of fact or statements of opinion but not both.
3. Prehearing Determination
In practice, virtually all respondents receive their guaranteed hearing within
the statutory five-day period,7" although many hearings result in continuances
that delay final dispositions. It is widely agreed that the five-day period
represents a good balance between minimizing the amount of time a person
may be held without a hearing and maximizing the acquisition of informa-
tion and preparation necessary for a meaningful judicial hearing. The five-
day period seems to be most constraining for the Assistant Public Defenders,
who find it difficult to prepare their cases adequately and completely in this
amount of time. This short time interval, they report, makes it difficult to
arrange for witnesses who will testify at the hearings on respondent's behalf.
Mental health staff apparently have no difficulty in examining patients and
preparing their necessary reports within the allowed time. Overall, the short
detention period and the statutory authority for allowing respondents to re-
main at home prior to the hearing" can be considered strengths of the
Chicago system.
4. Notification of Rights
A respondent usually learns of his or her legal rights from two sources:
the hospital examiner and the attorney, usually the Assistant Public Defender.
73. CHICAGO SITE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55.
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 /, § 3-611 (1983).
75. Id. § 3-704(a). As noted above, however, the home placement option is seldom used.
See supra note 21.
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The hospital examiner is required to inform respondent of the purpose of
the examination and of respondent's right to remain silent.76 If the hospital
examiner certifies respondent for admission pending a judicial hearing, the
respondent will be informed of additional rights, pursuant to the policy of
the particular hospital and the statutory requirements. Attorneys who are
assigned to represent these cases generally will repeat these rights to the
respondent during their first meeting.
Although it appears that all respondents receive information about their
legal rights and the civil commitment process, many questions are raised
about the efficacy of this procedure for the respondent.77 Mental health staff
frequently consider such communications to be a waste of time, believing
that respondents are for the most part too ill, too anxious, and generally
too confused to comprehend the rights and process about which they are
being informed. Staff personnel say that overwhelming such people with con-
fusing papers and verbal gibberish merely exacerbates an already strained
situation.
Assistant Public Defenders, on the other hand, express the opinion that
respondents often are not informed adequately about the civil commitment
and hospitalization process.78 These attorneys report that many of the
respondents they meet with in the hospital do not understand what is hap-
pening to them, what is going to happen to them during the prehearing and
hearing procedures, how they can request various types of assistance, and
how they can request release from the hospital. Assistant Public Defenders
report that their clients often think that public defenders are part of the
hospital staff, and that as a result, many seem to resist (or at least do not
cooperate with) counsel's assistance. Non-lawyers agree that few respondents
really understand their legal rights or how to make use of them, and suggest
that more individual and thoughtful counseling with each respondent is
necessary.
Typically, statements of rights seem to be communicated to patients more
to satisfy the letter of the law, than to provide patients with information.
To be effective, these statements should be presented in simple language.
Additional information can be available and provided to patients who re-
quest a more thorough understanding of their rights. Moreover, a patient's
understanding of these materials can be enhanced significantly by a personal
discussion and explanation. This should include information about hospital
procedures, what will happen during the prehearing and hearing processes,
and how to 'request services. In offering such information, however, hospital
staff and respondent's counsel should take a respondent's condition and in-
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 3-208 (1983).
77. CHICAGO SITE REPORT, supra note 18, at 45-47.
78. Explanations of the patient's rights to some extent encompass an explanation of the
process that the person is about to experience.
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terest into account. Patients should be able to decline or defer the explana-
tion of their rights if they are uninterested.79
5. Voluntary Admissions
As noted previously, Illinois law creates three classes of mental health
admission-informal (under which a patient is entitled to leave the facility
at any time),"0 voluntary (under which a patient consents to treatment, but
may be held up to five days after requesting release),' and involuntary.2
When a petition for involuntary civil commitment has been filed, the respon-
dent is often encouraged to apply for voluntary admission prior to the com-
mitment hearing.
It is generally acknowledged that everyone benefits when a patient is in
the hospital on a voluntary rather than an involuntary status. From the
respondent's point of view, voluntary status generally brings more privileges
and a more satisfying experience as a patient. It also enhances the likelihood
that therapy will have a positive effect upon the patient and avoids the stigma
of a public record of involuntary commitment. Hospital staff also prefer
to work with patients who are on voluntary status because of the greater
possibility of a successful therapeutic outcome. Additionally, the voluntary
status means considerably less paperwork and less time spent in hearings
for the hospital staff. Thus, from both the liberty and helping perspectives,
and from the standpoint of reducing costs for the public at large, the op-
portunity for short-circuiting the involuntary commitment process through
a voluntary admission is one of the strengths of the Chicago system.
Some Chicago judges were concerned, however, that respondents were being
pressured into making "voluntary" applications by hospital staff. The Il-
linois Code strongly discourages coercing patients into seeking voluntary ad-
mission to a facility, 3 and a form regularly filed by counsel following the
filing of an appliction for voluntary admission requires confirmation that
the attorney has explained "to the respondent his/her rights as a voluntary
patient, [and] . . . his/her right to demand a court hearing. . . " on the
involuntary commitment petition. The attorney must also state that the fil-
ing of the voluntary admission application "is the respondent's free willing
79. Patients' lack of interest in their rights may be an indication that to apprise them of
such rights would be anti-therapeutic. Thus, the system should provide the patient with an
option to decline or defer the explanation of rights. CHICAGO SITE REPORT, supra note 18, at 59.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91V2, § 3-300 (1983).
81. Id. §§ 3-400 to -405.
82. Id. §§ 3-600 to -706.
83. Id. § 3-402. This provision states that physicians, qualified examiners and clinical
psychologists may not try to convince a person to voluntarily admit himself by indicating the
prospect of involuntary admission unless someone qualified under § 3-602 is prepared to ex-
ecute a certificate for involuntary admission and the person is advised of his rights upon an
involuntary admission. Id.
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and informed act."' Through this process, judges are assured by the at-
torneys that patients are not being talked into treatment against their wishes
and without a court hearing."5
Mental health patients' advocates have been concerned about the same
84. The following form is used by the courts to confirm that the patient has been explained
his rights.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT --- COUNTY DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF
f))))))))
Confirmation of Attorney's Interview
I, , an Assistant
Public Defender,/ staff attorney of the Guardianship and Mental
Health Advocacy Commission/, attorney in the private practice
of law have interviewed
the respondent herein prior to the filing of his/her application
for admission as a voluntary patient pursuant to the provisions
of Article IV of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Code. I have explained to the respondent his/her rights as a
voluntary patient. Further, I have informed the respondent of
his/her right to demand a court hearing on the question whether
he/she is subject to involuntary admission.
It is my opinion that the application -for voluntary
admission is the respondent's free, willing and informed acL.
Dated:
85. In some cases, judges still require the patient to come to court so the judges can be
personally satisfied that the application for voluntary admission was made willingly.
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issue from a different perspective. They point out that while treatment as
a voluntary patient is much preferable to treatment as an involuntary pa-
tient, a person who has never been a patient has virtually no information
upon which to make an intelligent decision about voluntary mental health
treatment. Consumers of most goods and services in our society can shop
around, see samples, and make trial purchases before they are "commit-
ted" to a decision. Patients' advocates would like to see respondents given
a tour of mental health facilities, introduced to doctors and other mental
health staff, and given a full explanation of potential treatments before they
are asked to elect voluntary admission.
It should also be noted that following the submission of an involuntary
commitment petition, a respondent is entitled to apply for voluntary admis-
sion. Nevertheless, the application may not be granted automatically. Even
if the application is accepted by the facility director, the Assistant State's
Attorney can object to the patient's voluntary admission. If an objection
is filed, the application must be reviewed by the court to determine whether
voluntary admission is truly in the interests of both the respondent and the
public." This requirement for judicial review is intended as a safeguard
against patients abusing the voluntary application privilege by using it as
a vehicle for obtaining release within a five-day period.
Because elections to seek voluntary admission are occasionally disputed,
some hospitals have begun routinely to complete the two mental health ex-
aminations and certifications required for involuntary commitments, even
if the respondent has chosen to seek voluntary admission. Hospital staff
do not like this procedure but have chosen it so that they can effectively
advocate involuntary commitment if respondent's election of voluntary ad-
mission is denied by the court. Hospital staff view this as an inefficient use
of resources because it forces the hospital to perform the second examina-
tion within a 24-hour period, which may not be useful for either the hospital
or the patient. Also, it requires that the second examination be performed
by a psychiatrist, which may not always be the best approach from a treat-
ment perspective. Furthermore, it requires that the examination begin with
the disclosure of the patient's right-to-silence, which many examiners dislike
under any circumstances and which seems especially inappropriate after the
patient has agreed to seek a voluntary admission.
Advocates for mental health patients do not agree that the practice of
having two examinations is necessarily a bad use of resources, however, and
recommend that this become a standard requirement in all cases in which
the respondent elects voluntary admission. These advocates assert that it is
considered prudent in virtually any other medical procedure for a person
to seek another opinion before undergoing any serious medical treatment.
Similarly, a respondent may be better advised after talking with two ex-
aminers. The second medical examination also may provide the court with
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 3-801 (1983).
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useful information for deciding whether or not to allow the voluntary
application.
Hospital staff object that this reasoning implies that hospitals are trying
to retain patients who do not really need hospitalization. They contend that
this is far from the truth in these days of scarce resources.
6. Pre-hearing Examination
As discussed above, two examinations, including at least one by a
psychiatrist, are required to retain a respondent in custody and bring an
involuntary commitment proceeding to a formal judicial hearing."7 The ex-
amination usually results from the core of evidence presented at the hearing
and, thus, is of critical importance. Examinations are conducted promptly
in Chicago, and the certificates of examination are properly filed. But, a
number of serious concerns were evident in the interviews with Chicago legal
and mental health professionals.
a. Independent Examination
Because of the importance of the pre-hearing examination, respondents
are entitled to request an examination by an independent examiner." In prac-
tice, however, independent examinations are rarely conducted. One reason
is that no mechanism has been established for funding independent examina-
tions. Moreover, requesting an independent examination usually means that
a hearing will be delayed at least one week, which is a major disincentive
for respondents to request these examinations. Finally, the independent ex-
aminers are appointed by judges rather than chosen by respondents, and
they usually are on the staff of the Illinois Department of Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities. Chicago attorneys feel that these examiners
are not "independent," because they are affiliated with the regular hospital
examiners, have access to and use of the other examiners' notes, and prob-
ably discuss the cases with the other examiners. This criticism is not meant
to imply that the Department's examiners have an unfair bias toward
hospitalizing people; it is only meant to suggest that Department examiners
are less likely than others to disagree with assessments made earlier by their
colleagues.
The availability of an independent examiner is important in establishing
the reliability of psychiatric testimony. Because the testimony of examiners
is so influential in these cases, testimony that fails to corroborate the original
psychiatric conclusions will be an important factor in the presentation of
respondent's case. The mechanics and circumstances under which indepen-
dent examiners can be made available must be worked out for the city of
Chicago. Other cities have used court-appointed private psychiatrists, who
are made available to respondents and are paid by the state. To minimize
87. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 3-804 (1983).
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costs, the psychiatrists need not be involved in every case. They can be "on
call" at the hospital or in a nearby office, available to provide an indepen-
dent examination within a couple of hours if so requested by the Assistent
Public Defender. The Illinois statute intended that this important resource
be available to respondents. Because it currently is not truly available, some
mechanism should be established whereby an independent examination can
be provided by a qualified examiner not employed by the Department of
Mental Health and Development Disabilities.
b. Language Barriers
Many foreign-born doctors work for the state health facilities in the
Chicago area. While most foreign-born doctors are highly regarded, and while
their medical qualifications are readily acknowledged, problems occur when
these doctors are not fluent in English. A doctor's lack of fluency in
English-particularly in idiomatic English-makes it difficult for respondents
to communicate with the doctor, and can lead to significant misunderstand-
ings and misinterpretations of statements made by respondents. Aside from
possibly leading to inaccurate medical observations and diagnoses, a poor
level of communication between doctor and patient can make already anx-
ious respondents uncooperative and can act as a barrier to establishing a
positive therapeutic environment, thereby discouraging voluntary admissions.
In addition, it can make reports and testimony difficult for the court and
counsel to understand. Accordingly, doctors who are to examine respondents
and prepare medical certifications should be required to display at least a
minimal fluency in both oral and written English.
c. Right to Remain Silent
When an examination is being performed for purposes of certification,
the examiner must tell respondent the purpose of the examination, that what
he or she says may be disclosed in court, and that he or she has the right
to remain silent during the examination. 9 If this is not done, the examiner
is not allowed to testify in court."
Most doctors and other examiners do not like to begin examinations by
"reading the rights" to respondents. They believe that this instantly destroys
any chance for a candid exchange in an atmosphere of trust and support,
creating instead an attitude of resistance and defensiveness. A significant
minority of others disagree. In their opinions, respondents are pleased that
89. Id. § 3-208.
90. Id. The statute does not provide any exceptions to this requirement. However, the Gover-
nor's Commission Report apparently did not intend for the requirement to be absolute. For
example, if the need for commitment becomes apparent only after an examination had begun,
it would be appropriate at that time for an examiner to give this information to the person
and continue with the examination. Furthermore, the Report specifies that the disclosure re-
quirements ought not to apply "to the traditional therapist-patient relationship. Gover-
nor's Comm'n Report, supra note 1, at 38.
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an examiner levels with them in this manner, resulting in an enhanced at-
mosphere of trust and cooperation. Few examiners, regardless of attitude,
report circumstances in which respondents refuse to talk with them as a matter
of legal right, although many respondents refuse to talk because they are
either too hostile or too sick to communicate. Assistant Public Defenders
and other attorneys feel strongly that the disclosures are important. They
point out that the respondent's statements become part of the court's public
record and are used by succeeding examiners. They feel that the disclosure
poses no problem for most examiners.
Many examiners reportedly do not always make the required disclosures
to respondents prior to the examination. Some are unaware of or do not
fully understand the requirement, while others consider the requirement in-
appropriate and ignore it as a matter of principle. Some examiners reportedly
ignore the requirement to assure that they will not be required to testify
in court. Other examiners go so far as to indicate on the certificates that
they have made the disclosures, even though they routinely do not do so.
Counsel for respondents report that judges do not consistently enforce the
statute with regard to the required statements about respondent's right to
silence during the examination.9
In effect, the system appears to work on a "gentleman's agreement" of
sorts: examiners are expected to follow the statute with regard to disclosures
as closely as possible, but rarely is there any consequence if they do not.
Few, if any, would endorse a change in either the practice or the statute;
nevertheless, there is a consensus that the certificate should record accurately
whether or not the respondent was properly informed of his or her rights.
One way of accomplishing this would be to change the form of the cer-
tificate so that the examiner is required to indicate this information clearly
and honestly.
d. Inadequate Examination Reports
Many attorneys and psychiatrists in the Chicago system feel that psychiatric
reports and certifications sent to the court are too conclusory in their
language. The underlying problem seems to be caused by attempts to com-
municate psychiatric findings in lay language. Attorneys fault psychiatrists
for communicating in technical jargon, but psychiatrists point out that the
process of translating technical terminology into more common language
forces them into making interpretations and conclusory statements. Attorneys
and psychiatrists seem to agree that the best reports would be those in which
psychiatrists could report their objective findings in their usual manner and
91. Counsel for respondents report incidents where examiners have admitted in court that
the right to silence was not disclosed by the examiner, but the judge nevertheless committed
the respondent. On the other hand, some judges have dismissed cases because the disclosures
were not properly made by the examiners. The Illinois appellate courts have held firmly that
disclosures are required prior to both certifying examinations for a commitment to be valid.
See In re Collins, 102 11. App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531 (1981).
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then follow up with an interpretation and conclusion presented in lay
language.
Judges fault the lack of useful information about the respondent's social
history and background. They would like a more extensive social history
to be performed as part of the prehearing examinations and to have the
results available to them at the time of the hearing. It should be noted that
such a social investigation is required for respondents alleged to be unable
to care for their basic physical needs.92 In practice, however, this informa-
tion seldom is provided as intended by statute.
The examination report is the core of the evidence presented at the com-
mitment hearing. When it is inadequate, the risk of an incorrect judicial
decision escalates sharply. Consequently, examining psychiatrists should be
encouraged to provide a full standard mental status examination report as
part of the medical certification.9 3 This report should include both the fac-
tual basis on which the psychiatric conclusions are drawn and the conclu-
sions themselves. Whenever possible, this report should be supplemented by
an interpretation of the information in lay language.
In addition, prior to the judicial hearing, the mental health facility should
be required to make an investigation of respondent's social and family situa-
tion and provide the findings to the judge. Mental health staff explain that
preparing such a report within the five-day prehearing period is extremely
difficult, especially with the diminished resources under which they currently
must function. Some compromise is possible. For example, it makes little
sense to perform a vigorous social history investigation for respondents who,
if they are to receive treatment, certainly will need to be hospitalized. Full
investigations might be undertaken selectively, in those cases appearing most
likely to necessitate them. In cases in which the information was not ob-
tained, but in which it is deemed to be important, a seven-day continuance
can be ordered during which the necessary investigation can be completed.
The obvious disadvantage of a continuance is the respondent's continued
detention. But, detention for purposes of exploring alternative community
placements is preferable to what may presently happen: prolonged commit-
ment to a hospital because treatment is needed and no social investigation
has been performed.
7. Prehearing Treatment
In practice, most respondents are given medication shortly after they are
admitted to hospitals. This medication is continued during the time that they
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 1-119(2) (1983).
93. The question of what constitutes a "standard" mental status examination undoubtedly
will generate differences of opinion among psychiatrists. This should not detract, however,
from the value of this recommendation. After consultation with the mental health community,
it may be useful to define carefully what a "standard" examination is, either in statute or
by court rule.
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are presented for judicial hearing.9 ' Controversy exists over whether or not
mental health patients ought to be medicated at their judicial hearing. On
one hand, a patient who is medicated effectively will frequently make a bet-
ter appearance before the judge and, thus, will not display symptoms of
psychosis that may influence a judge to order commitment. On the other
hand, medication, particularly overmedication, can work against a respon-
dent during a hearing. Medication sometimes will cloud a person's thinking,
rather than sharpen it, and diminish the respondent's ability to testify effec-
tively on his or her own behalf. Undesirable side effects of some medica-
tions also cause respondents to appear gravely mentally ill or unable to con-
trol their actions. The prompt provision of treatment will benefit the respon-
dent in most instances and will reduce the need for lengthy and expensive
hospitalization. However, to assist judges in making commitment decisions,
they should be informed of all medication that was provided to the respon-
dent during the prehearing period, and the probable effect that the medica-
tion currently has on the respondent and his or her ability to testify in court.
8. Prehearing Discharge and Dismissal
A strength of the Illinois system is that the involuntary commitment pro-
cess may be halted quickly when such a commitment appears to be un-
necessary or ill-considered. If either of the two required examiners does not
find that the respondent meets the statutorily prescribed criteria, the respon-
dent is immediately released and the case does not proceed to a judicial hear-
ing. If the respondent's symptoms remit during the period of time preceding
the judicial hearing, the hospital will discharge the patient. In this situation,
if the case has already been set for a hearing, it will be dismissed when
it is called. Similarly, if a respondent consents to a voluntary admission,
counsel confirms that the decision is indeed voluntary, and the court con-
cludes that such an admission is of benefit to the respondent and the public,
the case is dismissed.9"
B. Counsel for the Respondent
1. Appointment of Counsel
Virtually every respondent facing possible involuntary commitment in
Chicago is represented by counsel. For all intents and purposes, counsel is
assigned by the court at the time the petitions and certifications are filed.
94. The Illinois Code permits hospitals to treat respondents as soon as a first examination
and certificate have been completed. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 3-608 (1983). It also requires,
however, that the respondents be informed of their right to refuse medication. If a respondent
refuses medication, drug treatment may proceed if it is deemed necessary to prevent serious
harm to the respondent or others. Id.
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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The vast majority of respondents in Chicago are represented by Assistant
Public Defenders, although some are represented by privately retained counsel,
privately appointed counsel, or attorneys from the Guardianship and Ad-
vocacy Commission.96
Respondents in Illinois have the right to represent themselves at commit-
ment hearings, with the consent of the court.97 In practice, however, this
rarely happens. It is less rare that respondents will reject the assistance of
counsel, usually because they are suspicious of the Assistant Public Defender,
but sometimes simply due to their generally confused state. In these situa-
tions, judges most frequently give the respondent the right to present his
or her case in court, but request that the Assistant Public Defender stay
at the respondent's side in court to "help out." Assistant Public Defenders
report, however, that when a respondent wishes to represent himself or
herself, the attorney is occasionally directed to provide legal assistance if
and only if the respondent requests help. This causes problems because
respondents frequently do not know when they need help. Counsel must
remain silent at a hearing, for example, while evidence to which counsel
should object is introduced. Thus, placing restrictions on the Assistant Public
Defender's freedom to "help out" in these cases can cause significant
difficulties.
Appointed counsel in Chicago are responsible for their clients primarily
during the prehearing and hearing phases of the commitment process. The
statute does not require counsel to maintain the attorney-client relationship
once a patient has been committed to treatment.9 Similarly, in practice it
appears that attorneys do not attempt to continue representing respondents
after commitment.
2. The Role of Counsel
In the extremes, two roles are possible for counsel who represent
respondents in voluntary civil commitment cases. Attorneys may play the
role of staunch advocates, battling in court for that which their clients
desire-usually prompt discharge from the hospital and dismissal of the case.
At the other extreme, attorneys may play the role of guardian ad litem.
In this role, they determine and work for what they feel is in their client's
best interest. This may be a discharge from the hospital, as the client wishes,
or continued custody and treatment, which may be contrary to the client's
96. The Illinois statute requires that counsel shall be appointed for indigent persons. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 3-805 (1983). In practice, no effort is made to determine whether or
not a respondent is indigent; unless a respondent has retained a personal attorney, the court
appoints counsel in every case.
97. Id.
98. Assistant Public Defenders do represent respondents in cases regarding patients' rights,
discharge hearings, and so on. But the attorneys are assigned as the cases come to the attention
of the courts.
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expressed wishes but congruent with the attorney's perception of what the
client needs.99
Judges in Chicago disagree as to which of these roles is more appropriate
for the attorneys to take. The dominant feeling of the courts, however, is
that an attorney for the respondent should act as a strong advocate. The
Illinois statute is well suited to this role for respondent's attorney: a heavy
emphasis is placed on legal rights and protections; an Assistant State's At-
torney presents the case for hospitalization; and hearings are held with for-
mal adherence to rules of civil procedure and evidence.' ° The courts should
continue to encourage counsel for respondents to act in the role of vigorous
advocates for their clients. Since the statute establishes an adversary pro-
cedure, it is imperative that counsel act as strong advocates for their clients'
stated desires. Of course, conscientious attorneys will meet with their clients
and will try to assist them to understand the available alternatives and to
choose the one that is best for them. But once the attorney has provided
such counsel, he or she must represent the client's stated interest as effec-
tively as possible.''
3. Adequacy of Representation
The Illinois statute specifies that counsel shall be allowed time for ade-
quate preparation and shall not be prevented from making an investigation
of the matters at issue and the relevant evidence. 0 2 The courts in Chicago
have been adamant in requiring counsel to meet personally with clients prior
to the hearings in order to prepare their cases for court. Judges encourage
adequate preparation by asking counsel whether they have met with their
clients regarding matters that arise before the court.
The system for providing legal assistance to respondents is one of the ma-
jor strengths of the Chicago civil commitment process. Overall, the Assis-
tant Public Defenders who provide the bulk of the representation in com-
mitment cases are a conscientious and well-informed group, providing com-
petent and thoughtful counsel. In addition, they are encouraged to assume
the role of strong advocates. Private attorneys and mental health advocates
in the Chicago area appear to believe that some Assistant Public Defenders
do not advocate for their clients as strongly as they should in many cases.
99. For a more extensive discussion of these conflicting visions of the role of counsel, see
Andalman and Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey,
a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Brakel, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals,
1981 A.B.F. RES. J. 23 (1981); Preparation and Trial of a Civil Commitment Case, 5 MENTAL
DIs. L. RPTR. 201 (1981); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PAR-
TIES, Standard 3.1 and commentary thereto (Approved Draft, 1978).
100. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, §§ 3-101, 3-205, 3-800-818, 6-100 (1983).
101. Equally important, the Assistant State's Attorney also must be an effective advocate
for the state in cases where hospitalization appears to be necessary.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 3-805 (1983).
[Vol. 33:225
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
To some extent, this reflects differences in individual skills and attitudes.
To a greater extent, however, this may be due to the fact that Assistant
Public Defenders in Chicago are clearly overworked. This is a primary
weakness of this aspect of the Chicago civil commitment system. Everyone
in the professional mental health and legal community concedes that there
are more mental health cases than the available Assistant Public Defenders
can handle. The Assistant Public Defenders meet with every civil commit-
ment respondent without fail, but they admit that they have too many cases
to be able to prepare thoroughly for the "really tough ones." The heavy
load and time constraints not only make it difficult for Assistant Public
Defenders to prepare for cases as well as they would wish, but also make
it difficult for them to spend time with their clients to explain the legal pro-
cedures and discuss legal strategies. It is particularly difficult for public
defenders to identify witnesses and make arrangements for them to be at
the hearing. Of course, decreasing this workload can be done only at substan-
tial cost. Either a greater number of Assistant Public Defenders must be
hired, or additional members of the Public Defenders staff will have to be
relieved of other duties so that they can work on involuntary commitment
cases.
Another option, consistent with the intent of the Guardianship and Ad-
vocacy Act,' 3 would be to assign state funded Guardianship and Advocacy
Commission attorneys to commitment cases more frequently. Despite the fact
that the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code assigns primary
responsibility for representing respondents in civil commitment proceedings
to the Commission,' 4 it is reportedly not very active in the city of Chicago.
Although its staff and their work are highly regarded, like everything else
connected with public mental health treatment, the Guardianship and Ad-
vocacy Commission apparently suffers from a lack of resources.
Whether greater resources are provided to the Public Defender, to the
Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, or to a fund for assigning, train-
ing and compensating private counsel to represent indigent respondents, the
solution to the workload problem will be difficult and costly to resolve. In
the opinion of many legal and mental health professionals in Chicago, it
may well be the most important improvement which can be made in the
civil commitment process.
103. Id. §§ 701-735. This act established the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission. The
Commission contains a Legal Advocacy Service, id. § 703, which has two basic functions: (1)
to make counsel available to persons in mental health judicial proceedings, including those
relating to admission, civil commitment, competency, and discharge; and (2) to make counsel
available to enforce any mental-health-related rights or duties derived from local, state, or federal
laws. Id. § 710. The Guardianship and Advocacy Commission also contains an Office of State
Guardian, which is authorized to act as a guardian for any person in the state for whom a
private guardian is not available. Id. §§ 730-731.
104. Id. § 3-805.
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4. Access to Information
Assistant Public Defenders report that their access to necessary informa-
tion is satisfactory. This may be a fortunate circumstance of the way the
system operates rather than a provision of law. The Guardianship and Ad-
vocacy Act assures access for Guardianship and Advocacy Commission at-
torneys to all mental health records,' °5 and the statute on civil commitment
provides generally that counsel shall not be prevented from making an in-
vestigation of relevant evidence."' 6 Nevertheless, the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, if read literally, would pro-
hibit Assistant Public Defenders from gaining access to hospital records
without their clients' explicit consent."' 7 Again, hospitals apparently have
not restricted the attorneys' access to these records, but they probably could
do so under the provisions of the Confidentiality Act if the respondent refused
to authorize access for the attorney. The danger exists that some mentally
ill persons, unknowingly acting against their own best interests, might refuse
to authorize such access for their attorneys, and thereby place counsel and
themselves at a distinct disadvantage. This danger would be alleviated by
passage of an amendment to the Confidentiality Act that clearly recognized
the right of an attorney representing a respondent in a civil commitment
proceeding to have access to that person's hospital records.
C. The Hearing-Meeting the Criteria for Commitment
This section discusses the events surrounding a judicial hearing on the ques-
tion of whether or not a person shall be committed for mental health treat-
ment. It considers the detailed characteristics of the hearing, the various
people who become involved in it, and the criteria that must be established
to determine whether a person is to be committed. Note that although in-
formation in the next section is relevant to the commitment hearing, it focuses
solely on the determination of the most appropriate treatment. This distinc-
tion, between determining whether or not treatment is needed, and deter-
mining the nature of treatment if it is needed, has been made primarily for
analytical purposes. During the judicial hearing, consideration frequently is
given to both matters simultaneously.
1. Characteristics of the Hearing
a. Time and Place
It is mandatory that every respondent facing involuntary civil commitment
have a judicial hearing within five court days from the time that he or she
is taken into custody or if the person is not in custody, within five court
days from the filing of a petition with the court."'8 With the exception of
105. Id. § 712.
106. Id. § 3-805.
107. Id. §§ 804-805.
108. Id. §§ 3-611, 3-706.
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the respondents who choose to enter a hospital on a voluntary status, a full
judicial hearing is held promptly for every person against whom an involun-
tary civil commitment petition is filed.
Commitment hearings are held every weekday at two hospitals in the city:
two days each week at Read Hospital for all respondents in hospitals on
Chicago's north side and the other three days at the Illinois State Psychiatric
Institute (ISPI) for respondents in hospitals on Chicago's south side. A
substantial majority of respondents are hospitalized either at Read or at ISPI,
which makes these sites convenient for hearings. Patients from other hospitals
are transported to Read or ISPI for their hearings.' 9 These procedures are
a major strength of, and a feature unique to, the Chicago civil commitment
system. In several of the other cities examined during the project, hearings
are held only once or twice each week despite statutory requirements
necessitating more frequent sessions. The weekday schedule in Chicago en-
sures that hearings will take place within the five-day statutory period. Ad-
ditionally, the practice of holding the hearings in the major mental health
care hospitals lessens the disruption of staff schedules, minimizes costs, and,
most importantly, reduces the anxiety, physical discomfort and trauma for
many of the respondents.
b. Presence of the Respondent
With few exceptions, the respondent is present at the hearing.'" A violent
respondent can be restrained and may be physically barred from the hearing
only as a last resort. Special hearings may be held in the respondent's hospital
room in cases in which the respondent is so gravely disabled that it is inad-
visable for him or her to attend hearings in the normal place.' The routine
presence of the respondent at the hearing can be considered a strength or
weakness of the Chicago system, depending on one's perspective. It has been
argued that respondents can suffer emotional and mental damage by listen-
ing to relatives, friends, and doctors testifying about them. Families fear
that the respondent's relationship with them will suffer as a result of the
courtroom experience. Examiners who are also the respondent's treating physi-
cians believe that respondent's presence during their testimony can signifi-
cantly interfere with their ability to establish a good therapeutic relation-
109. In special circumstances, hearings may be held in downtown Chicago at the Daley Center
in the city's regular civil courtrooms. For example, all jury trials are held at the Daley Center
rather than in hospitals. The hearing is also conducted at the Daley Center if a respondent
is not being held at a hospital pending the hearing. In addition, if a particular judge begins
a case at a hospital and the case is continued past the time that the judge is assigned to hear
mental health cases, the hearing is scheduled for the downtown courtroom where that judge
is hearing a regular schedule of cases.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 V2, § 3-806 (1983). The court is responsible for notifying the
respondent, his or her attorney, and the director of the facility of the time and place of the
hearing. Id. §§ 3-611, 3-706. Because these people are so closely involved in these cases, notifica-
tion is not a problem. The court is also responsible for notifying other people designated by
the respondent, and respondent's "responsible relatives." Id.
Ill. Id. § 3-806. In practice, the respondent's presence is almost never waived.
19841
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
ship. Furthermore, the presence of the public in the courtroom can be a
source of embarrassment to the respondent and may worsen his or her
condition.
Alternatively, there are several advantages to having respondents present
at the hearings. When respondents are present, they are able to assist in
their defense to a greater extent. Also, the judge is personally able to see
the respondent's condition and need not rely solely on the reports of the
witnesses. Moreover, some doctors feel that the courtroom experience is fre-
quently a useful precursor to successful treatment. First, it demonstrates to
the respondent that he or she has not been confined surreptitiously by the
doctor or family; the formalities of the judicial system help confirm that
the confinement is an official act of the state. Second, respondents may be
strongly influenced by orders or advice given to them directly by the judge.
Finally, the basis for commitment is articulated during the hearing. The
respondent hears about those aspects of his or her behavior that are con-
sidered unacceptable, which can be a useful starting point for shaping the
respondent's behavior into more socially acceptable forms. Since the respon-
dent's presence at the hearing may be waived by respondent's attorney and
the hearing can be closed to the public, it appears that it would present
substantial risk of serious harm to the respondent. The risk to the few
respondents who might be harmed by being present at the hearing can be
minimized without curtailing the right of respondents generally to participate
in the hearing.
c. Jury Determination
Illinois is one of the few states that permits respondents to request a jury
determination of whether they meet the criteria for commitment." 2 Few such
jury trials occur in Chicago, however. Jury trials are considered inconven-
ient because they must be held downtown where jurors are available, and
because they take longer due to the extra process of jury selection and the
need for a more thorough presentation of evidence. Those who have ex-
perienced jury trials in commitment cases say that the jury's presence has
no influence upon the final decisions because the judges would have decided
the cases the same way that the juries did. For these reasons, jury trials
are viewed by the legal community as a bother and delay, with no apparent
benefit for the respondent. Consequently, attorneys generally advise their
clients not to request a jury trial.
d. Public Access
All involuntary commitment hearings in Chicago are open to the public,
and the records of court proceedings are considered to be public documents." 3
In practice, the issue of public access to the hearings is seldom raised.
112. Id. § 3-802.
113. Id. § 6-100.
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Although a considerable number of people observe hearings, it is probably
safe to say that most are either professionals in training (doctors, nurses,
social workers, or college students) or researchers. ' " Observers from the
general public are rarely in attendance.
Courtroom proceedings are generally orderly and proper. Attorneys have
pointed out that courtroom decorum is extremely important in civil commit-
ment cases because of the sensitivity of the matters being heard and the
high anxiety level of the respondent and family members involved in these
proceedings. Because of the sensitive nature of these proceedings, special
care should be taken to ensure that the courtroom environment is quiet and
orderly and that careful attention is given to witnesses as they testify.
2. Presentation of Evidence
Before a person is involuntarily committed, it must be shown that because
of mental illness, the person reasonably can be expected to inflict serious
harm on self or others in the near future or that the person is unable to
provide for basic physical needs so as to avoid serious harm." ' An explora-
tion of specific and explicit evidence is required to establish a condition of
mental illness and grounds for believing that respondent is either dangerous
or substantially unable to provide for his or her own needs. Psychiatric jargon
is not accepted as testimony without being explained in lay language. Con-
clusory statements by mental health staff or other witnesses are not accepted
unless specific facts are presented to explain how such conclusions were
reached. 'I
a. Role of the Assistant State's Attorney
An Assistant State's Attorney presents the case for hospitalization in every
involuntary civil commitment case. The Assistant State's Attorney's presen-
tation of the case for the hospital is a major strength of this system. Without
114. Conceptually, the easy accessibility to court records presents a more difficult problem,
particularly when otherwise confidential hospital records are introduced into evidence. Although
court records are traditionally public documents, provisions have been made in some states
for sealing or expunging records of courtroom procedures that may be damaging to particular
individuals and are not of sufficient value to the public to justify their public availability.
Because of the stigma that society attaches to mental illness and involuntary commitment, it
has been suggested by some Chicagoans that court records on these matters not be open to
the public in order to protect the privacy of the individuals involved. It is ironic that this
problem seems to be simultaneously extremely important in concept and extremely unimportant
in practice. It is highly important to the hospitals that their work remain confidential; it is
equally important to the courts that their work remain public. Yet, in all the interviews we
conducted in Chicago, these conflicting values and practices were never identified as a serious
source of difficulty and nobody expressed concern that confidential hospital records were easily
available through public court files.
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91V2, § 1-119 (1983).
116. Because the Civil Practice Act applies to commitment hearings, id. § 6-100, the eviden-
tiary rules applicable to other civil proceedings apply here.
117. Id. § 3-101.
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this assistance, the judge and the hospital staff would have to assume the
role of advocates rather than the more neutral roles they traditionally per-
form. Although some people believe it is the Assistant State's Attorney's
job to represent the petitioner, the statute specifies that the State's Attorney
is to represent "the people of the State." '7 Thus, the statute apparently
grants the Assistant State's Attorney the discretion to pursue a case in the
manner he or she determines best serves the public's interest, which may
not necessarily be to advocate strongly for a respondent's hospitalization.
Chicago Assistant State's Attorneys reportedly do, in fact, make a personal
decision about the merits of each case and present the case at a hearing as
they feel is appropriate. In most cases, of course, the Assistant State's At-
torney agrees that the patient requires hospitalization and, therefore, advocates
the hospital's point of view.'' 8
b. Role of the Examining Psychiatrist or Clinical Psychologist
Unless the respondent waives the requirement, one psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist who has personally examined the respondent must testify in per-
son at the judicial hearing.'' 9 Psychiatrists and psychologists testifying in
court tend to present a neutral assessment of facts and opinions related to
respondents' mental conditions. Examiners do not feel comfortable advocating
either for or against a respondent's hospitalization and they are not expected
to take this role.
In some cases, the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist who prepared the
certificate or who is actually treating the respondent testifies at the hearing.
In others, the examiner represents the hospital and testifies on some or all
of the cases being heard on a particular day, regardless of whether he or
she is the treating or certifying examiner. For lack of a better term, the
latter type of examiner can be called a "professional examiner."
The practice of employing a professional examiner has advantages and
disadvantages. Observations of many commitment hearings made during the
project revealed that a professional examiner usually makes a much better
witness in court than the typical doctor. This type of examiner is frequently
more familiar with civil commitment law, knows how to present psychiatric
testimony in a manner that is useful for the court, and testifies in a par-
ticularly understandable manner. Further, the professional examiner is often
118. In the rare instance in which the petitioner has retained an attorney, the Assistant State's
Attorney usually does not participate and the petitioner's attorney presents the case for com-
mitment. The fact that the petitioner is represented by private counsel probably does not make
much difference except for those cases in which the Assistant State's Attorney would decide
that it would best serve the people of the state to not press hard for hospitalization.
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91V2, § 3-807 (1983). The court also may appoint one or more
examiners to make an additional examination of the respondent and provide a report to the
court and to the attorneys for the parties. Id. § 3-803. With few exceptions, a single examiner
testifies at a judicial hearing, because the respondent rarely waives the requirement for an ex-
aminer to testify and the court seldom appoints additional examiners.
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more at ease with legal requirements such as advising a respondent of his
or her rights during an examination. The professional examiner is also useful
from the hospital's point of view. Doctors point out that testifying in court
significantly disrupts their day, reduces the amount of time they can spend
with patients, and can seriously harm a therapeutic relationship with a pa-
tient. The use of a professional examiner avoids all of these problems.
Many inexperienced examiners find the judicial hearing to be a totally
alien environment and, consequently, testify in a manner that pleases neither
themselves nor the attorneys. Doctors, who usually are accorded high respect
and unquestioned authority in medical matters, are not accustomed to being
queried about their conclusions and forced to justify the process by which
those conclusions were reached. Frequently, they have had no formal train-
ing about legal procedures and do not appreciate either what is expected
of them or the process through which it will be obtained. 2 Attorneys report
that some examiners are hesitant to provide information and force the at-
torneys to "drag the facts out" through a series of probing questions. Other
doctors and psychologists habitually use technical language that is not ac-
ceptable by, or understandable to, the court.
Conversely, the professional examiner's appearance in court means, in ef-
fect, that without the use of a subpoena, respondent's attorney may not
be able to cross-examine psychiatrists and psychologists whose allegations
are instrumental in respondent's hospitalization. Moreover, the professional
examiner's testimony will, of necessity rely more heavily on written records.
Perhaps the most common problem that occurs during testimony is when
the examiner is asked to assess the respondent's dangerousness. Psychiatrists,
psychologists, and social workers receive no special training in predicting
dangerous behaviors. Empirical studies have shown that predictions of
dangerousness are notoriously poor, and are no better when done by pro-
fessionals than by lay individuals.' 2 ' Determinations of dangerousness should
be based on threats or specific behaviors in which respondent has engaged
in the recent past that are dangerous per se. It is possible, of course, that
an examiner will be able to testify about dangerous behaviors that he or
she has observed directly,' 2 or will be able to testify convincingly that respon-
dent is potentially dangerous, even in the absence of an overt threat or
dangerous act. In most cases, however, the petitioner and other witnesses
should be required to testify about specific dangerous behavior they have
observed in respondent, and this specific behavior, not psychiatric testimony,
should be the primary basis for deciding whether or not a respondent is
dangerous to self or others.
120. A short meeting with examiners who do not testify frequently prior to hearings and
an orientation to the process may be of considerable benefit to everyone involved and probably
could be done quickly and inexpensively.
121. See supra note 70.
122. It is most likely, however, that a respondent's behavior will be subdued physically or
medically during the time that he or she is seen by the examiners.
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It should be noted that petitioners are strongly encouraged to attend the
judicial hearings as witnesses. Indeed, Chicago judges seem to be stricter
about requiring the petitioner and other witnesses to be at the hearing, than
those in several of the other cities observed during the study. Many hearings
also will have mental health professionals (such as therapists, social workers,
and nurses) in attendance to testify as needed. Nevertheless, Assistant Public
Defenders reported that, in practice, an examiner will often be the only
witness at a hearing.
c. Role of the Judge
In any adversary system, the arguments for and against commitment are
to be presented by counsel. Judges have significant freedom to take dif-
ferent roles as they see fit. At one extreme, the judge can act entirely as
a neutral factfinder, listening to the cases presented by the attorneys and
depending upon the attorneys to establish all of the necessary facts upon
which to base a decision. At the other extreme, judges can engage actively
in asking questions and eliciting information from the parties in the case.
For the most part, Chicago judges believe that they serve the role of a
neutral trier of facts and thus depend upon the Assistant State's Attorney
and the Assistant Public Defender to establish the bases for and against com-
mitment. Some attorneys in Chicago, however, express the opinion that
Chicago judges take too active a role in the hearings, ask too many ques-
tions on their own initiative, and sometimes seem to be helping the Assis-
tant State's Attorney make the case for hospitilization. Judges admit that
they frequently solicit information that they believe is important and that
has not been sufficiently established in testimony elicited by the attorneys.
The extent to which judges directly examine witnesses, and whether such
examination is slanted either for or against hospitalization, undoubtedly varies
from judge to judge and from case to case.
From both the helping and liberty perspectives, it is advantageous that
judges solicit information actively during the hearing. Occasionally, the case
for or against hospitalization will be made not on the basis of the patient's
needs, but on the varying abilities of the attorneys. In the interest of com-
plete factfinding, a judge who suspects that some important information may
not have been brought out during testimony should take the opportunity
to question witnesses directly.
d. Role of the Respondent
In Chicago, respondents are subjected to a seemingly contradictory system
of rules and procedures regarding the disclosure of information that might
be harmful to their cases. The Illinois statute is one of a few that grants
the respondent the right to remain silent during a psychiatric examination.' 23
123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 3-208 (1983).
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Psychiatric examiners are required to explain to respondents the purpose of
the examination, to warn them that the information given to the examiner
may be used in court, and to indicate clearly that they have the right to
remain silent during the examination. If this is not done, the examiner is
specifically barred from testifying in court.
Once the respondent reaches a Chicago courtroom, however, the privilege
against self-incrimination seems to evaporate. Assistant Public Defenders
report that the state occasionally will call a respondent to the witness stand
in the hope that the respondent will "hang himself." Having failed to
demonstrate convincingly that the respondent meets the statutory criteria for
commitment, the Assistant State's Attorney may hope to impress upon the
judge that the respondent is really in need of treatment by asking respon-
dent to take the stand and discuss the delusions or hallucinations that form
the basis of the mental illness diagnosis.
Thus, even if a respondent refused to speak with an examiner in order
to avoid self-incrimination, this privilege could disintegrate in the courtroom.
The Assistant State's Attorney, with a psychiatrist by his side, could call
respondent to the witness stand and ask him or her a series of questions
that, in essence, could serve as the basis for a psychiatric examination. The
psychiatrist then could be called to the stand to testify as to his or her pro-
fessional opinion about the respondent's condition.
If courtroom practice and the Illinois statute are to remain in agreement,
a change in one or the other seems to be called for. Assistant Public
Defenders feel strongly that their ability to represent their clients and pro-
vide effective legal counsel is seriously undermined by the state's authority
to order the respondent to take the witness stand at a hearing. An amend-
ment to the provision of the Illinois Civil Practice Act may be in order to
exempt respondent in involuntary commitment cases from the general pro-
hibition against persons refusing to testify against their own interests in civil
cases.
e. Use of Records
In Chicago, as in most other cities, it is commonplace that hospital records
are allowed into evidence in commitment hearings. These are records about
the respondent made by attending physicians, therapists, nurses, and other
ward attendants. Attorneys disapprove of the use of hospital records because
such use deprives them of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
the persons who allege the information that is damaging to their clients.
Hospital personnel, on the other hand, argue that enormous expense would
be involved if their entire staff had to be prepared to attend hearings and
serve as witnesses in virtually every civil commitment case.
In addition, information about previous psychiatric commitments and treat-
ment is allowed into evidence at most hearings in Chicago. The Chicago
legal community appears to have established an informal working principle
that evidence of psychiatric history will be admissible to establish "psychiatric
opinion" but not "legal fact." This seems to mean, in practice, that the
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evidence may be used to form diagnoses and plan treatment strategies, but
cannot be used as a sufficient basis for concluding that the respondent must
be committed. According to statutory definition, eligibility for commitment
must be established on the basis of recent behaviors and examinations. 24
The use of records regarding prior commitments even for these limited pur-
poses should be closely monitored because such information can have the
effect of biasing decisions in favor of involuntary hospitalization. Once
previous behaviors and events have been found sufficient to satisfy the com-
mitment criteria, the future use of the records resulting from that commit-
ment proceeding and the subsequent treatment should be severely limited.
Otherwise, a psychiatric history would make it virtually impossible for a
respondent to avoid being committed again. A person should be committed
only because his or her current condition warrants it.
Attorneys also indicated that judges tend to view the existence of pending
criminal charges as evidence of a respondent's dangerousness. Whether or
not information relating to pending criminal charges is entered into evidence
during the hearing, such information probably will come to the judge's at-
tention because it is part of the background information that the judge will
have before him or her. 2 ' However, criminal allegations that have not yet
been proven in court should not be taken as facts to support the contention
that a respondent is dangerous.
3. Continuances
For good cause shown, continuances can be granted for periods up to
fifteen days on the court's own motion or on the motion of the Assistant
State's Attorney.' 2 6 If requested by the respondent, continuances may be
granted for any period of time. Continuances are fairly common in Chicago.
Indeed, private attorneys and patient advocates express the opinion that too
many continuances are granted. But those who are most frequently connected
with the hearing-judges, Assistant State's Attorneys, and Assistant Public
Defenders-do not believe that the number of continuances is unreasonable
or that continuances are often granted without good reason.
Judges have several reasons for granting continuances on their own mo-
tions. Judges believe that in some situtations a respondent can receive suffi-
cient help within fifteen days, obviating the need for commitment. By grant-
ing continuances in these situations, judges believe that they are helping such
respondents because no record of involuntary commitment will be maintain-
ed. On the other hand, judges also order continuances on their own motion
124. It should be noted that the statutorily required determination that a person is mentally
ill, as distinct from a differential diagnosis used in determining the appropriate treatment, rarely
necessitates information from previous psychiatric hospitalizations.
125. The admissibility into evidence of information on pending criminal charges is of greater
importance, however, in the rare case in which a hearing is before a jury, who otherwise would
not be aware of the pending charges.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 3-800 (1983).
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when they believe that a particular respondent ought to be committed, but
witnesses who are critical to the case fail to appear in court.
The hospital occasionally asks for a continuance such as when a doctor
is ill or otherwise unavailable at the time of the hearing, when the respon-
dent has left the hospital without an authorization, or when the respondent
has requested voluntary admission and the papers have not yet been com-
pleted or forwarded to the court.' 27
A respondent may request a continuance for a number of reasons also.
If a respondent has contracted a physical illness, for example, the respon-
dent's attorney may request a continuance until the patient has recovered
sufficiently to be able to attend the hearing. If the respondent's attorney
has been unable to communicate effectively with his or her client, the at-
torney may request that the court grant a continuance while he or she at-
tempts to prepare for the case more adequately. Or, if the respondent is
currently in a violent state, a continuance may be requested so that the
respondent can be treated to the point where he or she can be present at
a judicial hearing.
Only one practice with regard to continuances in Chicago is cause for
concern. If a hospital, other than Chicago Read or ISPI, plans to request
a continuance in a particular case, the hospital staff frequently does not
transport the respondent to the hospital at which the hearing is scheduled
to be held. The hospital requests the continuance with the expectation that
it will be routinely granted. Assistant Public Defenders contend that this
practice deprives them of the ability to object to a continuance on the behalf
of their clients. They point out that even if their objections were effective,
the hearing probably would be continued to the next week anyway because
there would not be enough time that day to bring the respondent from the
other hospital to the place of hearing. Hospitals should be required to
transport respondents to the place of hearing in every instance, even if the
hospital is requesting a continuance, unless the motion for continuance has
been discussed with the respondent's counsel in advance and there is no
objection.
D. Hearing-Determining Treatment
1. Presentation of a Treatment Plan
Illinois is one of a handful of states that requires a formal treatment
plan-describing the respondent's problems and needs, the treatment goals,
proposed treatment methods, and a projected timetable for their attainment-
to be presented by the mental health facility during the judicial hearing.' 28
127. The Assistant State's Attorney may also request a continuance if he or she feels the
need to get more information to decide whether or not to object to the voluntary application.
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 3-810 (1983). The other states studied depend upon either
finding the information in hospital reports submitted to the court or in having the information
elicited during testimony from the examiner or treating physician. For a discussion of the other
states' procedures, see supra site reports listed in note 6.
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Implicitly it is clear that if no effective treatment can be anticipated for
a respondent, the state will have failed to make its case for respondent's
commitment. A related effect of requiring treatment plans is that it eliminates
a problem that occurs in other systems when judges commit patients to a
hospital only to have the hospital refuse admission because the respondent
is not a fit case for treatment.
Mental health professionals generally are not enamored with the require-
ment of proposing a treatment plan at the initial hearing. They commented
that a treatment plan which is based upon less than five days with a patient
who may be in an acute psychiatric crisis, is likely to be highly tentative.
Working within an environment in which patients have a broad right to refuse
treatment, it may be difficult to say whether, when, and how specific treat-
ment modalities will be implemented. The result in Chicago has been a pro
forma conformity with the requirements of the law. Physicians and attorneys
in the Chicago system agree that treatment plans submitted during initial
hearings are shallow, brief, non-specific, and characterized by one person
as "boilerplate." These treatment plans do not form the basis for a useful
challenge to a commitment because their contents are so broad as to be vir-
tually meaningless. In addition, an enormous amount of hospital staff time
is spent in preparing treatment plans for the court, because treatment plans
are prepared for all patients who go through hearings, including those who
are released and whose treatment plans therefore go unused.
Despite the generally unhelpful final product that is sent to the court,
people in the system are not seriously opposed to the presentation of treat-
ment plans at the hearing and go so far as to suggest that they may, indeed,
serve a purpose. The requirement of filing a treatment plan forces hospital
staff to confront the question of treatment choice and the feasibility of that
choice for each respondent. Courtroom discussion of treatment plans, even
in generalized terms, has value in educating lawyers and judges about the
types of treatment that are available in the hospitals, the time periods in
which treatments might be effective, and the nature of "cures" that may
be expected from these treatment modalities.
The value of treatment plans would be significantly enhanced if they were
more specific about the respondent's condition and discussed alternative treat-
ment modalities. In order to make such greater detail possible without fur-
ther infringing on hospital staff time, consideration should be given to prepar-
ing treatment plans only for those respondents found eligible for commitment.
2. Treatment Options and the Less Restrictive Alternatives Doctrine
Virtually any mental health facility or hospital with a mental health unit
that is willing to accept a respondent on order of the court is statutorily
deemed an appropriate placement site.' 29 Most of the judicial commitments
129. Id. § 3-811.
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are to public hospitals. Nevertheless, a statutory preference is expressed for
treatment in the least restrictive alternative.' 30
In civil commitment hearings, the least restrictive alternatives doctrine can
be applied in two different ways. One application treats the doctrine as a
threshold issue: Is there a way to administer treatment in a setting that is
less restrictive than inpatient hospitalization? If the answer to this question
is yes, then a respondent's case is dismissed and no commitment is ordered.
The second application is to consider the doctrine in the context of a com-
mitment alternative: Given that a person meets the statutory criteria for com-
mitment, what is the least restrictive manner by which treatment can be pro-
vided? Although the Illinois statute requires the second application of the
less restrictive alternatives doctrine,"' in practice, judges also employ the
first application of the doctrine and may dismiss a respondent's case if
evidence reveals that a viable outpatient alternative is available.
The question of least restrictive alternatives is raised invariably at every
hearing, frequently in a pro forma manner and rarely with thoughtful, careful
consideration. Most often, it arises in response to a question by the Assis-
tant State's Attorney to the hospital examiner as to whether less restrictive
alternatives were considered for the respondent and whether such alternatives
are appropriate. Hospital staff usually respond that less restrictive alternatives
have been considered and are inappropriate, without providing any detail
about what specific nonhospital placements had been explored and the reasons
they were ruled out. Most frequently, the reasoning for this decision as ex-
pressed in testimony does not flow from an analysis of existing alternatives
but from an examiner's opinion that a person must be hospitalized, thereby
rendering discussion of other alternatives irrelevant.
The nature of Chicago's mental health system, at least in part, explains
both why less restrictive alternatives are not often considered extensively dur-
ing commitment hearings, and why caution is needed to be sure that they
are considered. Because of the effective network of outpatient clinics in
Chicago, people who might benefit from treatment alternatives that are less
restrictive than inpatient hospitalization are likely to receive treatment from
the CMHCs. Thus, most people who reach judicial hearings in Chicago are
seriously ill and need inpatient care. For most hearings, then, it probably
is safe to assume that less restrictive alternatives are inappropriate and that
a careful investigation of placement options, even though statutorily required,
is not a useful expenditure of personnel resources. The inherent danger of
this situation is that a presumption will be made that, because the system
works as it does, and because the respondent has reached this stage of the
process, the respondent must be seriously ill and in need of hospitalization.
The purpose of the hearing is to establish whether or not hospitalization
130. Id.
131. Id.
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is necessary, yet the Chicago system practically invites that conclusion as
a presumption.
Assistant Public Defenders in Chicago express the opinion that more at-
tention could be given to community-based less restrictive alternatives than
is given in most cases. Although the responsibility to consider treatment op-
tions is fixed by statute on the mental health facility's director,' respon-
dent and respondent's attorney have a greater interest in considering alter-
native resources. The Assistant Public Defenders make an effort to deter-
mine whether or not an alternative would be appropriate in a particular case,
but they are severely constrained in this effort by their taxing caseload. These
attorneys suggest that a small staff of social workers should be specifically
designated to do a careful investigation of the alternatives to hospitalization
available to respondents in mental health cases. Organizationally, this staff
could be located in the Department of Mental Health and Developmental
Disablities, the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, or the court. 33
Currently, neither hospital mental health staff nor judges and attorneys
have extensive knowledge of community-based facilities. Both the mental
health and the legal communities involved in involuntary commitment need
to be better informed about the resources available in Chicago and to have
access to updated information about the capacity of community programs
to accept new cases. A heightened awareness by judges and attorneys of
the types of treatment programs available in the Chicago area, the way these
programs function, and the types of people who are eligible to receive their
services, would help implement the statutory intent to utilize less restrictive
alternatives.
One way of facilitating such an awareness would be to establish a system
whereby current information about community-based, less restrictive treat-
ment alternatives and their capacity to accept new cases is readily accessible.
Community treatment facilities handle an enormous caseload and are cur-
rently experiencing a decrease in funding from government sources. Thus,
it is important to know not only that a less restrictive treatment facility ex-
ists, but also whether it has the capacity to accept new treatment cases.
Liaison to these agencies might be established through the Guardianship and
Advocacy Commission, the Department of Mental Health and Developmen-
tal Disablities, or through the court staff.
Another problem that has bothered judges and community-based treat-
ment staff about commitment to less restrictive alternatives is the lack of
any enforcement mechanism. If a respondent is committed to attend treat-
132. Id. § 3-810.
133. As discussed earlier, some of the burden of exploring less restrictive alternatives could
be relieved if the effort was limited to those respondents actually found eligible for commit-
ment rather than for all respondents. Background information about a respondent still could,
and should, be compiled prior to a hearing; but a detailed investigation of community treat-
ment resources would be done only if it was determined that the respondent was in need
of them.
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ment sessions or take medications, the statute provides no method to en-
force this plan.' 3' The lack of an enforcement mechanism has made many
judges reluctant to commit a respondent to a community-based facility and
has made such facilities hesitant to accept a patient who is under a commit-
ment order. Consideration should be given to a statutory change to put en-
forcement power behind commitments to less restrictive alternatives.'
Of course the limited reliance on the use of community-based alternatives
to hospitalization is not solely due to problems in the civil commitment pro-
cess. Community-based programs are hard to establish and seem to be
decreasing in number. The general public does not respond well to having
"mental cases" walking the streets or, worse yet, living in the house next
door. For these as well as budgetary reasons, structured residential facilities
are in short supply, not only in Chicago but in many major cities.
3. Judicial Specification of Treatment Modalities
Judicial orders of commitment only place the respondent into the care
of a person or an institution. Judges have not attempted to write orders
that specify treatment modalities or restraints for the institution. Conse-
quently, institutions have retained full discretion over the manner in which
the patient is to be treated once he or she is sent to the institution. While
this practice is widely considered appropriate-essentially leaving the com-
mitment to the judge and the treatment to the doctors-a judicial order regar-
ding specific treatment that conforms with the treatment plan submitted by
the hospital is not out of the question.
Moreover, members of the legal community often overlook the fact that
the concept of the least restrictive alternative can be applied within a hospital
setting as well as to community-based outpatient resources. Hospitals have
a variety of treatment programs and alternatives that vary in restrictiveness:
home visiting privileges, grounds privileges, open wards, locked wards, and
seclusion rooms. Traditionally, the hospital has been viewed as a unitary
treatment option that a judge might order. The Illinois statute, however,
authorizes the court to order the least restrictive alternative for treatment
that is appropriate for the respondent' 3 6 and there is no apparent reason
why it would be inappropriate for the court to order the least restrictive
alternative within a hospital setting. It would appear that courts can, in most
instances, rule on the allowable level of restrictions which may be imposed
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 3-811, 3-812 (1983). If a patient fails to comply with
a court order for community-based treatment, the court may modify its order and place the
patient in another form of treatment, but the court cannot force the patient to attend the
community-based treatment sessions. Id. § 3-812.
135. For example, the statute could be amended to require that a hearing be held to order
a new less restrictive alternative or hospitalization for the remainder of the authorized commit-
ment period, if evidence is presented that a less restrictive treatment alternative is failing to
meet the person's needs, either because of the person's lack of cooperation or a deficiency
in the treatment modality.
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 3-811 (1983).
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on patients without usurping the treatment authority of mental health
professionals.
4. Voluntary Outpatient Treatment
The Chicago legal community has devised an informal process that has
come to be called "voluntary outpatient treatment." The process has no
formal legal basis and is purely independent of any statutory prescription.
The process is invoked cooperatively by the judge, the Assistant States's At-
torney, and the Assistant Public Defender for people whom they consider
to be "borderline," i.e., people who seem to need some help but are not
ill enough to meet the statutory criteria of "subject to involuntary admis-
sion." To invoke the process, the Assistant Public Defender informs the
judge at the hearing that the respondent would like to receive voluntary out-
patient treatment. If the judge agrees, the case is not dismissed, but the
person is not committed. Instead, the respondent agrees to enter an outpa-
tient treatment facility and report back to the court after ninety days. A
request is made for a ninety-day progress report from the treatment staff
at the outpatient facility. If good progress is made, the case will be dis-
missed after the ninety-day period. If no progress has been made and the
respondent's condition seems to warrant it, the commitment process is
reinitiated at the discretion of the petitioner. Judges and attorneys have had
much success with voluntary outpatient treatment. Although they admit can-
didly that its legal standing is completely uncertain, the informal arrange-
ment has not been challenged.
E. Posthearing Matters
1. Monitoring Treatment and Patient Progress
The treatment plan considered during the commitment hearing must be
revised and filed with the court no more than thirty days after'a respondent
has been involuntarily committed. The court is to review this document to
determine whether "the patient is benefitting from treatment" and has the
authority to discharge the patient or to rehear the case if it is not satisfied
with the report.' 37 In practice, although hospitals regularly file the thirty-
day plans with the court, judges almost never review them."' Mental health
professionals and attorneys agree that the requirement to file a thirty-day
plan is a good one, but only if the plans are reviewed, rather than filed
away. The appropriate person to review these plans may be the respondent's
137. Id. § 3-814.
138. The treatment plan and reporting requirements specified by statute apply equally to
community-based, less restrictive treatment alternatives. Chicago judges report little success,
however, in receiving progress reports from staff in these facilities. This may be another reason
why judges are hesitant to use less restrictive treatment alternatives. Some mechanism should
be established to provide information to the court about a patient's progress in, and the services
offered by, a community treatment program.
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attorney. Although Assistant Public Defenders assigned to mental health cases
are already overburdened, the review of thirty-day plans would not con-
stitute a major increase in their workload because only a small fraction of
their clients remain in treatment long enough for a thirty-day plan to be
prepared. Thus, only a handful of plans would have to be reviewed each
month.
The staff at treatment facilities are required to review and update treat-
ment plans at least every thirty days after the initial revision, but need not
file such revisions with the court except in connection with a hearing. This
guarantees that each patient's case receives continual attention, at least on
a monthly basis. Furthermore, to the extent that patients and their families
participate in the preparation of treatment plans, patients are less likely to
resist treatment and, therefore, more likely to benefit from it.
2. Respondent's Right to Refuse Treatment
The issue of a patient's public right to refuse treatment following com-
mitment is one of the most difficult issues in mental health law. Involuntary
commitment in no way presumes that a patient lacks the capacity to make
decisions about treatment. "9 Questions of competency or capacity to make
treatment decisions are not raised during civil commitment hearings and,
if raised at all, must be taken up in separate guardianship proceedings. Con-
temporary law and practice have firmly fixed the principle that patients may
not be held in custody without receiving treatment."" Yet, if a patient is
allowed to refuse all treatment, the institution's only options are to discharge
the patient or to hold him or her without treatment. Inpatient treatment
centers around Chicago reportedly honor the patient's right to refuse
treatment.'"' Private institutions, which are populated almost exclusively by
voluntary patients, will discharge patients who refuse to accept treatment
rather than force the treatment upon them. Public hospitals will honor the
patient's right to refuse a particular treatment and will work with the pa-
tient in an attempt to offer treatment in other modalities that the patient
finds more acceptable. If a patient in a Chicago public hospital refuses treat-
ment of any variety, the hospital frequently will attempt to transfer the pa-
tient elsewhere or may release the patient rather than continue to hold him
or her without providing any form of treatment. Outpatient treatment
facilities depend primarily upon their patients' voluntary desire for treat-
ment. The patient's right to refuse treatment in outpatient facilities is prac-
tically absolute; if the patient does not want treatment, he or she simply
stops attending the treatment facility.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 2-101 (1983).
140. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (persons involuntarily
committed under the rationale that they are in need of treatment have a due process right
to treatment), rev'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 2-107 (1983). The statute provides, however, that a patient
may not refuse services which are necessary to prevent the infliction of serious harm by the
patient on himself or others. Id.
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Some doctors believe that the statute is interpreted too strictly in Illinois.
They point out that the right to refuse treatment is to be honored unless
treatment is "necessary to prevent the recipient from causing serious harm
to himself or others."'" 2 Because in other sections of the statute this type
of exception is expressed as "physical harm,"'" 3 the omission of the word
"physical" seems to indicate that other types of harm, such as emotional
and mental harm, may justify the administration of treatment over the pa-
tient's objection. Others point out the ethical bind in which the right to
refuse treatment places mental health professionals. For example, if a
depressed patient refuses treatment that would relieve the depression, and
if the refusal is seen as a manifestation of the illness, does a professional
service provider have a responsibility to try to convince the patient to accept
it? The line between friendly persuasion and authoritarian coercion is hard
to define. On the other hand, this right coupled with the limitations over
the more intrusive forms of therapy such as the use of physical restraints,
isolation, and electroconvulsive shock, substantially protects the patient against
some of the abuses that have occurred elsewhere." 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The civil commitment process in Chicago has a number of major strengths,
and some significant weaknesses. From a legal perspective, the outstanding
feature is the legal rights afforded the respondent and the measures taken
to protect those rights. By statute, hospital policy, Department of Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities administrative rule, and the everyday
practices of counsel, an extraordinary concern is shown for the legal rights
of all respondents involved in this process. The Illinois statute and the im-
plementation of this law in Chicago stand among the best in safeguarding
patients and litigants. In addition, there are the routine provision of counsel,
and the procedures and practices designed to prevent a respondent from
becoming lost in the system. Finally, throughout the process, there is the
emphasis on using the least restrictive alternative and the least drastic means
available to assist a respondent. The primary weaknesses of this civil com-
mitment process include: the absence of a requirement for direct testimony
or for evidence of an overt act or threat demonstrating that a respondent
is dangerous; the overreliance on psychiatric records during the hearing; the
lack of legal mechanisms for ensuring that a respondent is complying with
an order of commitment to a community-based program; and the inade-
quate number of resources available to counsel for indigent patients and
respondents.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-108, 2-109. It is interesting to note that the text proposed for §
2-107 in the Governor's Commission Report included the adjective "physical." Governor's
Comm'n Report, supra note 1, at 27.
144. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Governor's Comm'n Report, supra
note 1, at 30.
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From a treatment perspective, the major strength of the Chicago system
is its network of Community Mental Health Centers. The array of preven-
tion, treatment, and aftercare services provided by the CMHCs help to relieve
the pressure for commitment and assist a great number of Chicagoans to
cope with their problems while avoiding deeper penetration into the mental
health system. Some beneficial aspects of the civil commitment process itself
are the opportunities for prompt treatment, the easy availability of noncoer-
cive treatment status through a voluntary admission, and the practice of
holding hearings at the two major hospitals accepting involuntary admis-
sions. Problems in the treatment area include the shortage of community-
based residential facilities for mentally ill persons and the lack of informa-
tion about those that do exist, the absence of additional background infor-
mation on respondents, the paperwork created by the stringent legal re-
quirements, and a patient's right to refuse treatment.
The report developed on the basis of the examination of the Chicago civil
commitment system offered a comprehensive set of recommendations ad-
dressing the weaknesses discussed above as well as other areas in which prac-
tices and formal procedures could be improved. These recommendations can
be found in the appendix to this article. Although the recommendations reflect
both the "liberty" and the "helping" attitudes, we recognize that others
will strike a different balance and that the implementation of some of these
suggestions will require the allocation or reallocation of scarce public
resources. Nevertheless, we urge their consideration for making a good civil
commitment system even better at providing assistance and protection to all
Chicagoans.
APPENDIX
In addition to presenting a descriptive analysis of Chicago's system of
law relating to the mentally ill, it is imperative that practical lessons be ex-
tracted from this work. These lessons are presented in the form of recom-
mendations, which were derived from several sources. Many of the recom-
mendations presented here were made by people involved with the Chicago
system. Others were made with reference to similar situations by people at
the other research sites. Some recommendations spring primarily from the
research staff's observations of civil commitment procedures and their review
of the professional literature on this topic.
After reviewing the list, some readers may be surprised that certain recom-
mendations have not been made. There are many issues in Chicago on which
recommendations might have been offered, but were not for two reasons.
First, if the Chicago system is administering a certain procedure in a man-
ner that appears impossible to improve upon, no recommendation was made.
Second, in some situations the countervailing factors are so nearly balanced
that any recommendation would be hard to justify. We preferred to make
no recommendation rather than to present one with a weak foundation.
The proffered recommendations are not one-dimensional. Most of them
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relate simultaneously to several substantive areas of concern. They have been
grouped according to what appears to be the most important focus of each
recommendation, although we are well aware that recommendations affect
other aspects of the system as well. Similarly, the implementation of some
recommendations will obviate or mitigate the need for others. For the sake
of simplicity and brevity, however, the recommendations have been presented
in a unidimensional list.
Finally, although all the recommendations are important, some are of
greater urgency than others. A three level rating system has been used.
Recommendations preceded by three asterisks(***) are the most critical; those
preceded by one asterisk (*) are the least urgent; and those with two asterisks
(**) some where in between.
Several factors went into the ratings. First, the theoretical importance of
each was considered from the points of view of the law, mental health treat-
ment, and general importance to society. Second, thought was given to the
likelihood that the recommendation could be implemented, based upon con-
siderations of cost and procedural difficulties. If a recommendation was both
theoretically important and easy to implement, it was assigned three asterisks;
if theoretically unimportant and hard to implement, it was given one asterisk
(if made at all). Other recommendations were rated in consideration of the
trade-off between importance and difficulty.
It would be surprising, indeed, if everyone agreed on the ratings assigned
to the recommendations. What may be an important recommendation to
one person may be not only unimportant but also objectionable, to another.
Many points of view were considered in both writing and rating the recom-
mendations. Final responsibility for deciding how the recommendations ap-
pear in this article lies with the authors. But final responsibility for how
the recommendations will be implemented rests with the people of the City
of Chicago.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RELATING TO VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS
( **) The court should meet with state hospital administrators to review
their reasons for their use of voluntary rather than informal admissions,
and the court should not interfere with this practice unless it clearly can
be shown not to be in the best interests of society and respondents.
(***) Some means should be established to expedite significantly the ap-
peal process after the rejection of a patient's application for voluntary ad-
mission to a hospital for mental health services.
( **) Once an involuntary commitment proceeding has been initiated and
the respondent has requested voluntary admission, if the court has any ques-
tion about whether voluntary admission is appropriate or needed, it should
require the filing of a second certificate of examination. If two certificates
already have been filed, the court should exercise its authority to require
another, independent examination.
(*) After an involuntary commitment has been initiated, a respondent who
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is considering voluntary admission should be given more complete informa-
tion about what he or she is "buying"; counsel should certify to the court
that such information has been given to the patient before the court accepts
the voluntary application.
B. RELATING TO RESPONDENT AND PATIENT RIGHTS
(***) Written information given to respondents regarding their legal rights
and protections should be rewritten in simpler language.
(*) Time and care should be taken to speak personally with every respon-
dent in order to explain clearly the respondent's legal rights and protections,
and the treatment and commitment process. Prior to doing so, respondent
should be asked whether he or she wishes to engage in this conversation,
so that this verbal explanation of rights can be waived at respondent's request.
(*) The certificate of examination should be changed to indicate clearly
whether or not the examiner disclosed the respondent's right to remain silent
during the examination as required by the statute.
(**) A procedure should be devised by which an independent examiner
can be appointed quickly and inexpensively, such examiner to be indepen-
dent of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
and to be available for examinations and presentation of results within a
short period of time.
(**) The mental health code should be amended to specify that a respon-
dent has both the right to testify and the right to refuse to testify at his
or her hearing. Alternatively, the Illinois Civil Practice Act should be amended
to specify that the respondent in a civil commitment hearing shall not be
compelled to testify.
(**) All involuntarily committed patients should have guaranteed access
to a telephone and should be provided with a reasonable sum of money
upon request if such telephones are pay telephones.
C. RELATING TO EVENTS AT THE HEARING
(***) Examiners who prepare certificates should be required to report what
psychiatric records they studied and which other examiners they consulted
before examining respondent and preparing the certificate. They should in-
dicate, if possible, which of their conclusions depend substantially on their
own observations and which primarily echo or reinforce prior conclusions
made by others.
(*) Respondents who can afford to reimburse the state for the expenses
of providing a public defender should be required to do so, or should be
encouraged to retain private counsel.
(**) Respondents should be required to be brought to every hearing, even
if a continuance is to be requested by the hospital.
(***) It should be required that at the time of a judicial hearing, the court
should be informed of the complete history of medication that was pro-
vided to the patient during the prehearing period, and the probable effect
that such medication currently has on the respondent and his or her ability
to assist counsel and to testify in court.
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(*) Judges should further emphasize courtroom order and decorum.
D. RELATING TO MATTERS OF EVIDENCE
(**) The court should encourage that specific overt acts or threats be
recorded on mental health petitions whenever possible in support of the allega-
tion that a person is dangerous to self or others or is unable to care for
his or her basic physical needs.
(***) Examining psychiatrists should provide, at a minimum, a full stan-
dard mental status examination report as part of the medical certification.
(**) Information on previous psychiatric treatment should be admissible
into evidence at the commitment hearing for purposes of diagnosis and treat-
ment planning, but should not be accepted as sufficient evidence that respon-
dent meets the criteria for commitment.
(**) Judges should not seek primary information about dangerousness from
examiners. Rather, dangerousness should be inferred from specific threats
or overt acts of respondent, reported in testimony given by petitioner and
other witnesses.
(**) At recertification commitment hearings, following 60-day or 180-day
commitment periods, a review of periodic treatment plans from throughout
the treatment period should be required as evidence that treatment has been
presented as planned and has been effective.
E. RELATING TO LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES
(**) Prior to the judicial hearing, the mental health facility should be re-
quired to make an investigation of respondent's social and family situation
and provide the findings to the judge.
(**) More attention should be given to less restrictive treatment alternatives
during judicial hearings.
(**) Judges and attorneys should become more aware of community-based
treatment programs that are available as less restrictive alternatives.
(*) A system should be established so that current information is readily
accessible about community-based, less restrictive treatment alternatives and
their capacity to accept new cases.
(***) In spite of all the difficulties of presenting treatment plans within
the first five days of treatment, treatment plans presented to the courts dur-
ing commitment hearings should be as specific as possible regarding respon-
dent's condition and should discuss the possibility of less restrictive treat-
ment alternatives within the hospital.
(**) Consideration should be given to a practice whereby detailed treat-
ment plans and considerations of less restrictive alternatives be undertaken
only for patients who are committed.
(**) Liaison should be established between the court and any community
outpatient facility to which a respondent is committed in order to provide
feedback to the court about the patient's treatment progress.
(**) Consideration should be given to a statutory change to put enforce-
ment power into commitments to a less restrictive alternative.
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F. RELATING TO PROFESSIONAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES
( **) Doctors who are to examine respondents and prepare medical cer-
tifications should be required to display a minimal fluency in oral and writ-
ten English.
(***) The court should continue to encourage public defenders and other
appointed counsel to act in the role of vigorous advocates for their clients.
(***) Ways should be identified to lighten the workload of the public
defenders.
(*) The Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act
should be amended so that counsel representing civil commitment respondents
are guaranteed free access to all relevant hospital records.
(***) Careful consideration should be given to the feasibility of increasing
the staff and extending the activities of the Guardianship and Advocacy Com-
mission in the Chicago area by having Commission staff act as (1) liaison
to community outpatient facilities, (2) patient advocates, and (3) guardians
ad litem.
G. RELATING TO CARE AND TREATMENT
(***) A copy of the 30-day treatment plan, which is filed with the court,
should be provided to and reviewed by the respondent's attorney.
(*) Procedures should be explored to facilitate the legal process of ap-
pointing guardians for respondents who are not able to provide for their
basic physical needs.
(*) The court and community care-providers should explore possible sources
of people who could be appointed legal guardians to respondents who are
not able to provide for their basic physical needs.
(**) Administrators of the city mental health clinics and state hospitals
should develop and implement a more cooperative procedure for referring
patients from the city clinics to the state hospitals, in order to effect a
significantly lower rate of admissions refusals.
(***) All community mental health centers that have not already done
so should establish effective ongoing liaison with state hospitals to facilitate
referral of all cases in their catchment area that are denied voluntary admis-
sion by the hospital and all patients who are discharged from the hospital
and would benefit from transitional support services.
(***) Upon request for information about a patient, hospital staff should
not automatically refuse to provide the information; rather, staff should im-
mediately check with the patient and inquire as to whether or not the pa-
tient wishes to authorize release of the requested information.
H. RELATING TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING
(**) A formalized training program should be established for the Chicago
police on the nature of mental health disorders, how to communicate with
and handle mentally disordered people, and community resources to which
mentally ill individuals may be taken.
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(***) An orientation should be given to inexperienced examiners who are
going to testify at a hearing, prior to the time that the hearing begins.
(**) Court and state hospital officials should arrange for the preparation
of a set of standard orientation materials to be used by legal and mental
health professionals who become involved with civil commitment in Chicago.
(**) Court and mental health professionals should arrange for periodic,
continuing education seminars in the Chicago area to keep people who work
in this system up to date on relevant developments in law, medicine, and
society.
